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Same-sex cohabitation is banned or unrecognized in most of the world.  
Forty years ago, same-sex couples were not legally accepted in any 
country.  In the last thirty years, however, around 20% of countries have 
granted some rights to same-sex couples, making them visible to society.  
While there are still countries that criminalize sexual relations among two 
consenting adults of the same-sex,1 other countries are allowing same-sex 
couples to marry and form a family.  Between those two poles, many 
countries have moved or are moving from total rejection of same-sex 
relationships to acceptance of some sort.  Countries that have 
decriminalized sexual relations between individuals of the same-sex have 
shortly thereafter seen a rise in the public debate about formal recognition 
of same-sex couples.  At the center of this debate is the role of marriage.  
While some scholars claim that marriage is essentially heterosexual and the 
basis for societal structure, others consider the exclusion of same-sex 
couples from marriage to be unfair discrimination.  Both positions are 
represented in the reports received for the 18th Congress of the 
International Academy of Comparative Law. 
Part I of this Article briefly explains the situation of same-sex couples in 
countries that have opened marriage to individuals of the same-sex.  
Although there may be a common understanding of what marriage entails, 
in some countries, same-sex marriage has become a subcategory of 
marriage, with different rules than heterosexual marriage and restricted 
access to certain rights.  Part II offers a summary and analysis of the status 
of same-sex unions in countries that sent reports to this Congress and have 
not opened marriage to same-sex couples.  Part III provides a comparative 
analysis of the most recurrent arguments used in the processes of 
recognition and denial of same-sex unions in the countries reviewed.  
Finally, Part IV draws some conclusions on the state of marriage today. 
I. THERE ARE MARRIAGES AND THERE ARE SAME-SEX MARRIAGES 
All legally sophisticated societies have regulated cohabitation.  It has not 
been individuals themselves who have restricted their sexual encounters, 
but rather each community has restricted the types of relationships publicly 
accepted.  Although modern legal systems have functioned on the basis of a 
separation between a public and a private realm, the way that the private 
realm has been shaped has been an entirely public affair.  Countries not 
only have traditionally determined a set of legally valuable relationships, 
                                                          
 1. The world was reminded again of this disparity after a gay couple in Malawi 
was sentenced to fourteen years of prison for sodomy and indecency.  Malawi’s 
President Bingu wa Mutharika issued a pardon to the couple after a visit of U.N. 
President Ban Kimoon but made clear that he condemned the couple’s behavior.  See 
Barry Bearak, Malawi President Pardons Gay Couple, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2010, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/world/africa/30malawi.html. 
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but they have also defined duties and rights for each party within a 
relationship.  In this context, the paradigm of the legally valued relationship 
has been marriage. 
Marriage may not mean the same thing in every country, but there is a 
general understanding that certain features are present when we meet a 
married couple.  Generally, it means that the couple went through some 
formal recognition of their relationship in a particular country and that their 
union produces legal effects in that country.  There is, foremost, an 
assumption that spouses are legally recognized as family.  Most likely, the 
couple’s offspring is legally accepted as their own in the country where 
their union was registered, and the couple has rights and obligations 
towards those children.  When one meets a married couple, it is safe to 
assume that some inheritance rights are also recognized.  Until recently it 
was also assumed that marriage required one man and one or more 
women.2  In the last thirty years, however, diversity of sex in marriage has 
become a contested issue. 
The Netherlands was the first country to redefine marriage as a union of 
two individuals regardless of their sex.  Instead of enacting a specific 
statute for same-sex marriage, in 2001 the Netherlands amended the rules 
of marriage in their Civil Code, stating that marriage could be contracted 
by two persons of different sex or of the same sex.3  With this change, and 
other later changes, most rules on marriage apply equally to both opposite 
and same-sex marriages. 
Originally, however, there were differences between same and opposite-
sex marriage.  Mainly, same-sex couples did not have access to 
international adoptions.  The Netherlands, however, amended its statutes in 
2005, allowing same-sex couples to adopt both locally and internationally.4  
Despite this equality of treatment, it would not be accurate to say that 
same-sex couples can exercise their right to international adoptions just as 
heterosexual Dutch married couples do.  There are still many countries that 
restrict adoption of their national children to heterosexual couples or single 
individuals, reducing the pool of countries from which same-sex couples 
can adopt.5 
                                                          
 2. Polygamy is rejected in many Western countries, and it triggers harsh criticism.  
Its opponents, however, do not take the position that polygamy is not marriage.  The 
rejection comes out of equality concerns or incompatibility with a liberal state, among 
others.  Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and 
Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1975 (2010). 
 3. Nancy G. Maxwell, Opening Civil Marriage to Same-Gender Couples: A 
Netherlands-United States Comparison, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 141, 157 (2001). 
 4. IAN CURRY-SUMNER, ALL’S WELL THAT ENDS REGISTERED? THE SUBSTANTIVE 
AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF NON-MARITAL REGISTERED 
RELATIONSHIPS IN EUROPE 145-47 (2003). 
 5. DENIS CLIFFORD ET AL., A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN & GAY COUPLES 113 
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A second difference referred to the marital presumption of paternity 
within marriage.  In the case of same-sex couples, no presumption can be 
made since it is biologically impossible for a partner of the same sex to be 
the biological parent of her spouse’s child.  Dutch legislation expressly 
established that the presumption of paternity did not operate in the case of 
same-sex couples.6  Although biologically correct, this exclusion meant 
that the only possibility of bi-parentage in the case of same-sex marriages 
was through stepchild adoption.  The Netherlands eventually changed its 
regulation in 2001.7 The female spouse of a woman who gives birth to a 
child is recognized as the parent of that child, as long as there is no 
recognizable father, as it would be in the case of a sperm donor.  This 
option, however, is not open to male partners who can only become parents 
of the same child through stepchild or joint adoption.8 
This is the only differential treatment in the Netherlands between same 
and opposite-sex married couples.  All couples can also opt for a registered 
partnership and a married couple can decide to switch their relation to a 
registered partnership and vice versa.9 
Belgium10 became the second country to open marriage to same-sex 
couples in June 2002.  Professors Swennen and Leleu explain that the 
expansion of marriage to same-sex couples was controversial and that there 
was great debate on the issue.  The main argument against the expansion of 
marriage to same-sex couples during the discussion of the bill was based on 
the interest of the State in protecting procreation, a feature exclusive to 
heterosexual marriages.11  The central idea was that heterosexual marriage 
was worthy of special protection because of a natural link to procreation 
that same-sex unions lacked.  The compromise at the end was to open 
marriage to same-sex couples but to deprive the union of affiliation effects, 
including adoption.12  Advocates of same-sex marriage may have been 
                                                          
(15th ed. 2010). 
 6. Katharina Boele-Woelki, Registered Partnership and Same-Sex Marriage in 
the Netherlands, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME SEX COUPLES IN EUROPE 44 
(Katharina Boele-Woelki and Angelika Fuchs eds., 2003). 
 7. Kees Waaldijk, Others May Follow: The Introduction of Marriage, Quasi-
Marriage, and Semi-Marriage for Same-Sex Couples in European Countries, 38 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 569, 576 (2004). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Wendy W. Schrama, Registered Partnership in the Netherlands, 13 INT’L J.L. 
POL’Y & FAM. 315, 322-24 (1999); see also Same-sex Marriage and Registered 
Partnerships in the Netherlands, HOLLAND SOUTH LOCAL REFERENCE INFORMATION, 
http://hollandsouth.angloinfo.com/countries/holland/gaymarriage.asp (last visited Nov. 
17, 2010). 
 10. Frederik Swennen & Yves-Henri, National Report: Belgium, 19 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 57 (2011) [hereinafter Belgium Report]. 
 11. Id. at 67. 
 12. Id. at 70. 
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happy to see that marriage was open to same-sex couples, but the new 
regulation was far from reaching equality between opposite and same-sex 
couples. Some scholars described it as an “amputated marriage.”13 
In 2003, Belgium amended its laws to allow adoption by same-sex, 
married couples.14  However, the presumption of paternity that the legal 
system grants to husbands is still not available to same-sex married 
couples.  Since surrogacy is not allowed in Belgium, same-sex couples can 
only become parents through adoption.15   
In 2005, Spain16 became the third country to amend its legislation and 
open marriage to same-sex couples.17  Law 13/2005 amended the Spanish 
Civil Code to include in the definition of marriage that marriage is a union 
between two people of undefined sex.18  The justification of the Act was 
grounded in the right to free development of personality and equality based 
on Article 32 of the Spanish Constitution, which states that men and 
women have the right to enter into marriage with full legal equality.19 
Professors Martinez de Aguirre and De Pablo Contreras disagree with 
the direction taken by the Spanish legislature and argue that same-sex 
marriage may be unconstitutional.  They consider that a correct 
interpretation of Article 32 of the Spanish Constitution should not lead to 
the recognition of same-sex marriage.20  Among other arguments, they 
claim that a grammatical interpretation of this article depends on the 
Dictionary of the Spanish Royal Academy’s definition of marriage as a 
long-term union between a man and a woman.21  The word “marriage,” 
therefore, requires the presence of both sexes.  Thus a same-sex marriage 
would be a contradiction in terms.  Professors Martinez de Aguirre and De 
Pablo Contreras argue that because the social importance of marriage 
derives from its heterosexual nature and its link to the procreation of new 
citizens, same-sex unions could not have the same social meaning because 
                                                          
 13. Id. at 65, 70. 
 14. Id. at 71. 
 15. Professor Swennen explained to me that surrogacy was performed in Belgian 
hospitals, though there was no current regulation on this matter.  Furthermore, some 
judges may not allow adoption of children born from a surrogate mother, and 
international surrogacy is illegal. 
 16. Carlos Martínez de Aguirre Aldaz & Pedro de Pablo Contreras, National 
Report: Spain, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 289 (2011) [hereinafter Spain 
Report]. 
 17. Law 13/2005, (Spain) (B.O.E., 2005, 157), available at 
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2005/07/02/pdfs/A23632-23634.pdf (last visited June 25, 
2010). 
 18. Spain Report, supra note 16, at 290. 
 19. Id. at 293. 
 20. Id. at 294. 
 21. Id. 
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they would be structurally incapable of reproduction.22  In their opinion, the 
Spanish legislature has changed the constitutional meaning of marriage by 
changing the core of the concept of marriage.  This argument was also used 
in 2005 to challenge the Act before the Constitutional Tribunal.23  The 
decision on this action is still pending.  Part III will discuss these 
arguments in more detail. 
Spanish law grants full equality to same-sex couples, including adoption 
without restrictions.  In this sense, it goes further than the Dutch and 
Belgian laws.  However, it also maintains the rules on paternity 
presumptions of the Civil Code.  Thus, bi-parentage within same-sex 
marriage can only be achieved through adoption. 
Spanish law does not establish rules on marriage of a Spanish citizen 
with a foreign citizen.  The interpretation has been, however, that a 
Spaniard can marry a foreigner of the same sex even if the partner’s 
country does not recognize same-sex marriage.24 
Almost at the same time as Spain, Canada25 opened marriage to same-
sex couples.  The Civil Marriage Act, enacted by the Federal Parliament, 
modified the common law definition of marriage by stating that “marriage, 
for civil purposes, is the lawful union of two persons to the exclusion of all 
others.”26  Professor Bureau states in her report that the pathway to same-
sex marriage began in the nineties, with several provinces granting rights to 
same-sex couples that only married couples enjoyed before.27  The Federal 
Parliament also took measures aimed at insuring equality for same-sex 
couples.  As an example, Professor Bureau cites the Loi visant à 
moderniser le régime d’avantages et d’obligations dans les Lois du 
Canada, enacted in 2000.28  This law amended sixty eight provisions to 
ensure a uniform application of federal laws to unmarried same-sex and 
                                                          
 22. Id. at 295. 
 23. For an account by the Spanish press, see El PP presenta recurso de 
inconstitucionalidad contra bodas gays, REUTERS, Sept. 30, 2005, 
http://www.20minutos.es/noticia/52467/0/ESPANA/GAYS/RECURSO/.  The 
constitutionality claim can be found at http://www.felgtb.org/files/docs 
/7cef87591594.pdf (last visited June 27, 2010) (Spain). 
 24. See Maria Ángeles Rodriguez Vásquez, Los matrimonios entre personas del 
mismo sexo en el derecho internacional privado español, 41 BOLETIN MEXICANO DE 
DERECHO COMPARADO [B.M.D.C] 194 (2008) (Mex.). 
 25. Marie-France Bureau, National Report: Canada, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 85 (2011) [hereinafter Canada Report]. 
 26. Lois Sur le Mariage Civil [Law on Civil Marriage], R.S.C., ch. 33, Article 2 
(2005) (Can.), available at http://www.canlii.org/fr/ca/legis/lois/lc-2005-c-
33/derniere/lc-2005-c-33.html (“Le mariage est, sur le plan civil, l’union légitime de 
deux personnes, à l’exclusion de toute autre personne.”). 
 27. See Canada Report, supra note 25, at 88–89. 
 28. Id. at 89. 
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opposite-sex couples.29 
Canada seems to have achieved complete equality between same-sex and 
opposite-sex marriages.  Same-sex couples can adopt just as opposite-sex 
couples can.  Regarding the paternity presumption within same-sex 
marriage, the rules vary from province to province.30  In Quebec, however, 
marriage entails a presumption of paternity that applies both to fathers and 
to the partner of the woman who gives birth.31 
There is one restriction applicable to same-sex marriage that relates to 
freedom of religion.  According to Article 3 of the Civil Marriage Act, 
officials of religious groups can refuse to perform marriages that are not in 
accordance with their religious beliefs.  In some provinces, this prerogative 
has been utilized, albeit unsuccessfully, to give civil servants the right to 
refuse celebrating a civil marriage when it goes against their religious 
beliefs.32 
South Africa33 is an interesting case of legal reform triggered by courts.  
The Marriage Act of 1961 defined marriage as a union between a man and 
a woman, but, in 2005, the Constitutional Court gave the legislature a year 
to amend the Marriage Act to include same-sex marriage.34  The reasoning 
was based on the values of human dignity, equality, and freedom.35  
Parliament consequently enacted the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006.36  Article 
1 of the Act states that “unless the context otherwise indicates, ‘civil union’ 
means the voluntary union of two persons who are both eighteen years of 
age or older, which is solemnised and registered by way of either a 
marriage or a civil partnership, in accordance with the procedures 
prescribed in this Act, to the exclusion, while it lasts, of all others.” 37 
Instead of amending the Marriage Act, South Africa opted for the 
creation of a new set of rules through the Civil Union Act.  There are four 
statutes in South Africa that regulate unions: The Marriage Act, the 
                                                          
 29. Id. 
 30. THE GREENWOOD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LGBT ISSUES WORLDWIDE 60 (Chuck 
Stewart ed., 2010). 
 31. Id.; see also Robert Leckey, ‘Where the Parents are of the Same Sex’: 
Quebec’s Reforms to Filiation, 23 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 62, 66 (2009). 
 32. Id. at 6. 
 33. François du Toit, National Report: South Africa, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 277 (2011) [hereinafter South Africa Report]. 
 34. Fourie v. Minister of Home Affairs, 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC) (S. Afr.), 
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2005/19.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 
2010). 
 35. Id. at 47. 
 36. Civil Union Act 17 of 2006, (S. Afr.) available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=67843 (last visited June 28, 
2010). 
 37. Id.  
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Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, the Civil Union Act, and the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act.38  Accordingly, couples have 
several options for civil recognition of cohabitation: 
1. Marriage according to the Marriage Act for heterosexual 
couples. 
2. Marriage for same and opposite-sex couples according to the 
Civil Union Act. 
3. Civil Partnership for same and opposite-sex couples according 
to the Civil Union Act. 
4. Marriage in accordance with the customs and usages 
traditionally observed among the indigenous African peoples of 
South Africa, as regulated by the Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act. 
It is interesting that the political compromise between opposing views on 
the topic of same-sex marriage has led South Africa to an array of 
alternatives, all of which seem to have the same effects.  The same rights 
and duties, including the right to stepchild adoption and adoption in 
general, apply to married couples under the Marriage Act, married couples 
under the Civil Union Act, and registered unions under the Civil Union 
Act.39 
Similar to Canadian law, the Civil Union Act allowed religious 
denominations to request their designated marriage officers to be exempt 
for conscientious reasons from registering civil unions of same-sex 
couples.40 
With regard to parenting, the rules on parental responsibilities are 
established in the Children’s Act 38 of 2005.  According to this regulation, 
it is possible for the spouse of the biological parent to enter into an 
agreement by which he or she assumes parental responsibilities of the 
child.41  The rules apply equally to same-sex and opposite-sex couples. 
Similar to South Africa, when Norway42 amended its Marriage Act in 
2008 to state that “two persons of opposite sex or of the same sex may 
contract marriage,”43 it authorized “marriage solemnizers” to refuse to 
celebrate a marriage.  Clerical solemnizers can refuse to solemnize a 
marriage if one of the parties is divorced and the previous spouse is still 
                                                          
 38. South Africa Report, supra note 33, at 280–82. 
 39. Id. at 284. 
 40. Civil Union Act of 2006. 
 41. South Africa Report, supra note 33, at 284. 
 42. Torstein Frantzen, National Report: Norway, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 273 (2011) [hereinafter Norway Report]. 
 43. Marriage Act, § 1 (Nor.) translated at http://www.regjeringen.no/en/doc/ 
Laws/Acts/the-marriage-act.html?id=448401 (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
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living or if the parties to the marriage are of the same sex.44  As explained 
above, this was also the model for Canada and South Africa.  This is the 
only difference between same- and opposite-sex marriage in Norway.  
Thus, the spouse of a woman giving birth obtains parental rights over the 
spouse’s biological child at the moment of birth. 
In 2009, Sweden amended its regulation and opened marriage to same-
sex couples.45  Adoption was already permitted to same-sex couples under 
a civil registered partnership.46  A distinctive feature of the Swedish 
experience is that the Swedish church was in favor of the expansion of 
marriage. In most countries, religious denominations have been a strong 
opposition to same-sex marriage.47 
Portugal,48 Iceland,49 and Argentina50 were the last three countries to 
legalize same-sex marriage by passing laws in 2010. 
Paragraph 1 of Article 36 of the Portuguese Constitution states that all 
persons have the right to form a family and marry in conditions of full 
equality.51  The second paragraph states that the law will determine the 
requirements and effects of marriage.52  These paragraphs were the grounds 
for a constitutional challenge of the definition of marriage set out by the 
Portuguese Civil Code.  In a case in 2007, brought by two women whose 
marriage license was denied, the Constitutional Court affirmed that 
prohibition of same-sex marriage was not unconstitutional―but neither 
                                                          
 44. Norway Report, supra note 42, at 274 (citing Marriage Act § 13 (Nor.)). 
 45. Fact Sheet, Gender Neutral Marriage and Marriage Ceremonies, MINISTRY OF 
JUSTICE (SWED.), May 2009, http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/12/55/84/ 
ff702a1a.pdf. 
 46. Yvonne C. L. Lee, “Don’t Ever Take a Fence Down Until You Know the 
Reason It Was Put Up”―Singapore Communitarianism and the Case for Conserving 
377A, 2008 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 347, 371 n.161 (2008) (Sing.). 
 47. For media coverage of the Swedish church support of religious same-sex 
marriage, see Same sex marriage suggested by board of Church of Sweden, 
STOCKHOLM NEWS (Swed.), June 13, 2009, 
http://www.stockholmnews.com/more.aspx?NID=3407. 
 48. Jorge Duarte Pinheiro, National Report: Portugal (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Portugal Report]. 
 49. In June 10, 2010, the Icelandic Parliament unanimously approved a law that 
allows marriage between same-sex partners.  See Michelle Garcia, Iceland Legalizes 
Gay Marriage, http://www.advocate.com/News/Daily_News/2010/06/11/ 
Iceland_Legalizes_Gay_Marriage/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
 50. On July 10, 2010, the Senate approved the bill with amendments to the 
Argentina Civil Code to redefine marriage as a union between two individuals, 
regardless of their sex.  See Juan Forero, Gay rights activists celebrate Argentine vote 
for same-sex marriage, WASH. POST, July 16, 2010, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/15/ 
AR2010071501119.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
 51. Portugal Report, supra note 48, at 2; see also VII Revisão Constitucional 
[Seventh Revised Constitution] Art. 36 (2005), available at http://www.parlamento.pt/ 
Legislacao/Paginas/ConstituicaoRepublicaPortuguesa.aspx (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
 52. VII Revisão Constitucional [Seventh Revised Constitution] Art. 36. 
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was same-sex marriage.53  The court left it to the legislature to regulate this 
matter.54  Three years after this decision, the Portuguese Congress passed 
Law 9 of 2010, redefining marriage as a contract between two people that 
intend to form a family through a community of life.55  Under the new 
statute all references to husband or wife became applicable to spouses in a 
gender neutral voice.56  The Portuguese legislature followed the original 
model of the Netherlands and Belgium allowing adoption to married 
couples of different sex only.57 
Recently, Argentina became the first Latin American country to allow 
same-sex marriage. Article 42 of the new Statute states: 
All references to the institution of marriage established in our legal 
system will be understood to apply to marriages between two people of 
the same sex as well as two people of different sex.  Members of families 
from a marriage of two people of the same sex, as well as those of a 
marriage by two people of different sex will have the same rights and 
obligations. No regulation of the Argentine legal system shall be 
interpreted or applied in a way that may limit, restrict, exclude or 
suppress the exercise or enjoyment of the same rights and obligations to 
marriages formed by two people of the same sex as well as the one 
formed by two people of different sex.58 
In addition to the countries already mentioned, there are countries with 
federal systems where the regulation of families is a state or provincial 
                                                          
 53. Acórdão No. 359/2009, Tribunal Constitucional [Constitutional Court], 
available at http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/acordaos/20090359.html (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Portugal Report, supra note 48, at 3; see also Diário da República, 1ª Série A - 
N 105 | 31 de Maio de 2010, Página 1853. Lei n. 9/2010,  art. 2, available at 
http://www.pgdlisboa.pt/pgdl/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?nid=1249&tabela=leis 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2010) (“. . . Casamento é o contrato celebrado entre duas pessoas 
que pretendem constituir família mediante uma plena comunhão de vida, nos termos 
das disposições deste Código.”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Permite o Casamento Civil entre pessoas do mesmo sexo, [Permitting for Civil 
Marriage for People of the Same Sex], Lei N 9/2010 art. 3 (Port.), available at 
http://dre.pt/pdfgratis/2010/05/10500.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
 58. Unofficial translation by the author.  The original text in Spanish states: “Art. 
42. Aplicación. Todas las referencias a la institución del matrimonio que contiene 
nuestro ordenamiento jurídico se entenderán aplicables tanto al matrimonio constituido 
por dos personas del mismo sexo como al constituido por dos personas de distinto sexo. 
Los integrantes de las familias cuyo origen sea un matrimonio constituido por dos 
personas del mismo sexo, así como un matrimonio constituido por dos personas de 
distinto sexo, tendrán los mismos derechos y obligaciones. Ninguna norma del 
ordenamiento jurídico argentino podrá ser interpretada ni aplicada en el sentido de 
limitar, restringir, excluir o suprimir el ejercicio o goce de los mismos derechos y 
obligaciones, tanto al matrimonio constituido por personas del mismo sexo como al 
formado por dos personas de distinto sexo.” available at 
http://www.infobae.com/download/55/0345567.pdf. 
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matter.  Mexico and the United States59 are notably in this position 
because parts of their territory have redefined marriage to include same-sex 
couples. The debate over same-sex marriage in the United States has been 
intense, both at the legislative and adjudicative level.  In his report, 
Professor Meyer gives an account of how Hawaii started a trend of political 
and legal fights that is far from being over.60  This discussion repeated in 
many states and it reached the federal government with the passing of the 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).61  Currently, Connecticut, Iowa, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and the District of Columbia 
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.62  Also, New York, Rhode 
Island, California, and Maryland recognize as valid same-sex marriages 
performed in other jurisdictions.63  In all of them, marriage is treated as a 
neutral institution where no differences are made between same-sex and 
opposite-sex marriages.  The only difference of treatment has been reported 
in Iowa, where hospital staff refused to include in the birth certificate of a 
child the female spouse of the biological mother.  As of August 2010, a 
lawsuit is pending on this issue.64 
Although states may have autonomy to define marriage, the federal 
benefits granted to married couples are too numerous for marriage to be 
considered an exclusively state matter.65  The lack of federal recognition of 
same-sex marriage, therefore, has an impact on the daily lives of same-sex 
couples.  There have been several challenges to DOMA.  The latest 
decisions are from July 8, 2010, handed down by a U.S. District Judge in 
Massachusetts.  In Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health Human 
                                                          
 59. David M. Meyer, National Report: United States published as Fragmentation 
and Consolidation in the Law of Marriage and Same-Sex Relationships, 58 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 115, 119 (2010). 
 60. Id. at 6. 
 61. Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). 
 62. See Sonia Bychkov Green, Currency of Love: Customary International Law 
and the Battle for Same-Sex Marriage in the United States, app. I (The John Marshall 
Law School, Working Paper Series, Mar. 1, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1562234 (detailing the current legislation in each state of the 
United States). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Lynda Waddington, Same-sex couple sues state for right to appear on 
daughter’s birth certificate, IOWA INDEPENDENT, May 13, 2010, at 
 http://iowaindependent.com/33946/same-sex-couple-sues-state-for-right-to-appear-on-
daughters-birth-certificate. 
 65. In the United States there are more than one thousand benefits granted by the 
federal government to married couples.  Additional state benefits vary and extend the 
difference of treatment. See Barbara J. Cox, “The Little Project”: From Alternative 
Families to Domestic Partnerships to Same-Sex Marriage, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 90 
(2000) (citing OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
GAO/OCG-97-16, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE HENRY J. HYDE, CHAIRMAN, 
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1997), available at 
www.gao.gov/archive/1997/og97016.pdf). 
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Services and Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, Judge Touro ruled 
that important parts of DOMA were unconstitutional for violating equal 
protection principles: 
In the wake of DOMA, it is only sexual orientation that differentiates a 
married couple entitled to federal marriage-based benefits from one not 
so entitled. And this court can conceive of no way in which such a 
difference might be relevant to the provision of the benefits at issue.  By 
premising eligibility for these benefits on marital status in the first 
instance, the federal government signals to this court that the relevant 
distinction to be drawn is between married individuals and unmarried 
individuals. To further divide the class of married individuals into those 
with spouses of the same sex and those with spouses of the opposite sex 
is to create a distinction without meaning. And where, as here, “there is 
no reason to believe that the disadvantaged class is different, in 
relevant respects” [citing Romer v. Evans, 571 U.S. 620, 635 (1996)] 
from a similarly situated class, this court may conclude that it is only 
irrational prejudice that motivates the challenged classification.  As 
irrational prejudice plainly never constitutes a legitimate government 
interest, this court must hold that Section 3 of DOMA as applied to 
Plaintiffs violates the equal protection principles embodied in the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.66 
Also, in September of 2009 members of the House of Representatives 
introduced the Respect for Marriage Act to repeal the DOMA.67 
The Federal District of Mexico passed a law in December of 2009 
amending its State Civil Code.  Marriage is now a union between two 
individuals and all rights and obligations attaching to married couples 
apply to same-sex married couples.68  The amendment also changed the 
rule on concubinarian unions to reflect that these unions can now include 
two female or two male concubines.69  The Attorney General of Mexico 
challenged the constitutionality of the statute on the basis that the 
constitutional mandate is to protect the family defined as a heterosexual 
                                                          
 66. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 396-97 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 67. H.R. Res. 3567, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 68. Decreto por el que se reforman diversas disposiciones del código civil para el 
distrito federal y del código de procedimiento civiles para el distrito federal, 525 
Gaceta Oficial del Distrito Federal [GODF], 29 de diciembre de 2009 (Mex.), available 
at http://www.metrobus.df.gob.mx/transparencia/documentos/marco%20normativo/ 
decreto%20codigo%20procedimientos%20civil.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2010) (Article 
146 of the Civil Code for the Federal District states: “Matrimonio es la unión libre de 
dos personas para realizar la comunidad de vida, en donde ambos se procuran respeto, 
igualdad y ayuda mutua. Debe celebrarse ante el Juez del Registro Civil y con las 
formalidades que estipule el presente código.”). 
 69. Article 291bis of the Civil Code now states that “female concubines and male 
concubines (“concubinas y concubinos”) have reciprocal rights and obligations.  The 
former article 291bis stated that the female concubine and her male concubine (“La 
concubina y el concubinario”) had reciprocal rights and obligations.  See id. at art. 
291bis. 
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and bi-parental institution.  He also challenged the rules on adoption 
because, with the expansion of marriage to same-sex couples, the statute 
opened adoption to same-sex couples.70  The Mexican Supreme Court 
upheld the statute, allowing same-sex marriage in the Federal District and 
stating that the Federal Constitution of Mexico provides a vague concept of 
family.  This interpretation leaves the door open to other states to amend 
their marriage regulations too.71  The first step towards same-sex marriage 
in the Federal District was the Law of Cohabitation Society (Ley de 
Sociedad de Convivencia) passed in 2006.  This statute defined 
cohabitation society as a legal act formed when two adult individuals of 
different or the same sex, and legally fitted, establish a common household, 
with the intent to stay together and assist each other.72 
“Same” is different 
Most countries reach recognition of same-sex marriage after a gradual 
recognition of same-sex couples that starts with the granting of partial 
material rights.  Recognition of marriage as the symbol of full equality is 
the culmination of these processes.  Married same-sex couples, however, 
have not automatically been granted all rights attached to heterosexual 
marriage.  The first and most common difference between opposite and 
same-sex marriage relates to marriage as the gateway to forming a legally 
recognized family.  Countries that were willing to allow marriage between 
two people of the same sex were not ready to recognize same-sex couples 
as a legitimate parental unit.73  Many countries have indeed opted for a 
regime of registered partnership with the specific purpose of distinguishing 
on one hand an institution that recognizes a union between two individuals, 
and on the other, an institution that transcends those two individuals and 
creates legally recognized family ties. 
The second common difference between same-sex and opposite-sex 
marriages is the treatment of these two institutions by private international 
law.  A country cannot guarantee that marriages performed under its laws 
will be recognized by other countries.  It can, however, regulate what 
marriages performed abroad, under foreign law, will be recognized in its 
own territory.  It can also restrict the conditions under which foreign 
nationals can marry within its borders. The Netherlands, for instance, 
                                                          
 70. Id. at art. 395. 
 71. The Supreme Court decision has not been published yet. 
 72. Decreto de Ley de Sociedad de Convivencia para el Distrito federal [Law of 
Cohabitation Society for the Federal District] art. 2, 136 Gaceta Oficial del Distrito 
Federal [GODF], 16 de Noviembre de 2006 (Mex.). 
 73. See Belgium Report, supra note 10, at 68–69; see also Portugal Report, supra 
note 48, at 2. 
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imposed more restrictive rules for same-sex than for opposite-sex couples 
on eligibility to marry in Dutch territory.74  Denmark had done the same 
with its Registered Partnership Act.75  Same-sex marriage creates a 
problem in international private law, just as polygamy, surrogacy, or other 
controversial practices that clash with national regulations.76 
The third common difference relates to marriage as a symbol.   A point 
of debate has been whether same-sex marriages should be recognized or 
solemnized by the same officers and through the same procedures as 
opposite-sex marriages.  In those countries where civil marriage is achieved 
through the recognition of a religious ceremony, the desire to protect 
freedom of religion and allow religious ministers to refuse the 
solemnization of same-sex marriage is understandable.  This protection, of 
course, should not be used as an excuse to create a policy of de facto 
discrimination by leaving same-sex couples without any available officer to 
perform a marriage ceremony.  In countries where civil marriage is a 
strictly secular process, the decision to separate officers and ceremonies 
does not have any grounds other than a political compromise.  Inclusion of 
same-sex couples into the mainstream institution of marriage has come, 
most of the time, with some type of relinquishment of the symbolism 
relating to marriage.  In some cases, religious ministers are not available.  
In other cases, the officer called to register same-sex marriage is different 
than the one who celebrates heterosexual marriages. 
II. FROM MARRIAGE-LIKE TREATMENT TO FULL INVISIBILITY 
The redefinition of marriage as a union between two individuals 
regardless of their sex is a twenty-first century phenomenon.  Regulation of 
same-sex cohabitation is a trend that started earlier, towards the end of the 
twentieth century.  Through legislative changes and judicial review, many 
countries have granted same-sex couples benefits and rights traditionally 
linked to marriage.  Although there are more countries that do not 
recognize any rights to same-sex couples than countries that do, the number 
                                                          
 74. Waaldijk, supra note 7, at 579. 
 75. Act on Registered Partnership N. 372 was enacted on June 7, 1989 with Section 
2.2 stating that “[a] partnership may only be registered provided that 1) one of the 
parties is habitually resident in Denmark and a Danish citizen, or 2) both parties have 
been habitually resident in Denmark the two years immediately preceding the 
registration.” See Boele-Woelki, supra note 6, at 215. 
 76. For an account on international private law and same-sex couples, see Gerard-
René de Groot, Private International Law Aspects Relating to Homosexual Couples, 13 
ELEC. J. COMP. L., Dec. 2007, at 1.  Regarding the recognition of Dutch same-sex 
marriage in other countries, see Michael Bogdan, Some Reflections on the Treatment of 
Dutch Same-Sex Marriages in Europe and in International Private Law, in 
INTERCONTINENTAL COOPERATION THROUGH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW: 
ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF PETER E. NYGH 25-35 (Tania Einhorn & Kurt Siehr eds., 2004). 
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of countries affording some form of recognition increases every day. 
Countries that recognize the existence of same-sex couples and regulate 
some components of their unions can be divided into three groups: 
1. Full equality of rights between same-sex and opposite-sex 
couples, but no access to the symbol of marriage. 
2. Recognition of same-sex couples as partners with ample 
recognition of material rights and a narrow access to building 
family ties. 
3. Recognition of same-sex couples as a lawful association 
between two individuals, narrow or no access to family ties, and 
limited material rights. 
A. Separate but equal 
The United Kingdom77 is among the few countries in the first category, 
with three registered partnerships that cover the three legal systems that 
make up the United Kingdom.  Professor Kenneth Norrie states that the 
Civil Partnership Act of 2004 created “a statutory institution for the legal 
recognition and regulation of same-sex relationships, which is distinct from 
but equivalent to the existing institution of marriage.”78 
Requirements to enter into a marriage and into a civil partnership in the 
United Kingdom are very similar.79  The grounds for dissolving a civil 
partnership are also the same for both institutions, with the exception of 
adultery.80  This cause for divorce is the basis for an interesting perspective 
raised by Professor Norrie regarding the real nature of the difference of 
treatment between marriage and civil partnerships.  In his opinion, whereas 
marriage is a sexed and religious institution, civil partnership, is a de-sexed 
and secular institution.81  He doesn’t deny that sexual relations are assumed 
between the parties in a civil partnership but he claims that, legally 
speaking, the sexual character of the relationship is irrelevant.  In fact, the 
only grounds for divorce that do not apply to partnership dissolution are 
adultery and sexual impotency.82 
With regards to the secular nature of registered partnerships, Professor 
Norrie states that registration of a partnership is exclusively in the hands of 
civil servants.  Marriage, instead, can be performed by civil servants or by 
                                                          
 77. Kenneth Norrie, National Report: United Kingdom, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 329 (2011) [hereinafter U.K. Report]. 
 78. Id. at 334; see also Civil Partnership Act, 2004, c. 33 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/33 (last visited Nov. 8, 2010). 
 79. See U.K. Report, supra note 77, at 333. 
 80. Id. at 334. 
 81. Id. at 334-36. 
 82. Id. at 335; see also Civil Partnership Act, 2004, c. 33 (Eng.), §§ 37-64. 
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religious officers vested with such powers by each recognized religion.83 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has divided the 
distinctions between same and opposite-sex couples between material, 
parental, and other consequences.84  An analysis of the differences between 
same-sex and opposite-sex couples in the United Kingdom leads to the 
conclusion that it treats marriage and registered partnership equally with 
regards to material and parental consequences.  The distinctions come 
within the umbrella of what the ECHR called “other consequences.”85 
These other consequences are closely tied to the idea of symbolism, which 
is what Professor Norrie links to religion.86  Without providing same-sex 
marriage, the United Kingdom gives better treatment to same-sex couples 
than the Netherlands originally did and Portugal has recently granted.  The 
United Kingdom also treats same-sex couples married abroad as civil 
partners.87 
In 1989, Denmark88 was the first country to legally recognize same-sex 
couples through a registered partnership regime open only to same-sex 
couples.89  Although the original text left most parental rights outside the 
scope of the act, today the differences between marriage and registered 
partnership are almost unnoticeable.  Since 2009, same-sex registered 
couples have the right to stepchild adoption with certain restrictions.90  
Also, all women have access to assisted reproductive technologies 
regardless of their sexual orientation and marital status.91  This change, the 
Danish report points out, was framed as a health issue rather than a family 
law one.92  It had, nevertheless, the effect of diminishing the difference 
between marriage and registered partnership as the gateway to family 
formation.  Finally, in July 2010, Denmark passed an act that allows same-
sex couples to adopt under the same conditions as married couples.93 
                                                          
 83. See U.K. Report, supra note 77, at 355. 
 84. Schalk v. Austria, 30141 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010). 
 85. Id. at 31. 
 86. U.K. Report, supra note 77, at 356. 
 87. Id. at 339–40; see also Civil Partnership Act, 2004, c. 33 (Eng.), §§ 212-18. 
 88. Annette Kronborg & Christina Jeppesen, National Report: Denmark, 19 AM. U. 
J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 113 (2011) [hereinafter Denmark Report]. 
 89. Professors Kronborg and Jeppesen point out that although Greenland and the 
Faroe Islands are part of Denmark, they have their own legal systems.  Greenland has 
had registered partnerships since 1996 but the Faroe Islands does not have any 
regulations for same-sex couples. See Cece Cox, To Have and to Hold—or Not: The 
Influence of the Christian Right on Gay Marriage Laws in the Netherlands, Canada, 
and the United States, 4 LAW & SEXUALITY 1, 7 (2005). 
 90. Denmark Report, supra note 88, at 118. 
 91. Id. at 119. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.; see also Lov 2010-05-26 nr. 537 (Den.), available at 
https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=10291 (last visited Nov. 9, 
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Today, the main difference between married couples and registered 
partnerships lies in what Professor Norrie called the secular feature of 
same-sex unions as opposed to the religious meaning of marriage.  Couples 
concluding a marriage in Denmark can choose to do so in a religious or in a 
civil ceremony.  Registration of a partnership, however, is a strictly secular 
act.94 
 
B. The meaning of the word “almost:” I can treat you as a spouse but not 
as a parent 
Several of the national reports referred to the situation of same-sex 
couples as “almost equal” to married couples.  This is the case of the 
reports from Australia, Austria, and New Zealand.  In all these countries 
same-sex couples enjoy property rights, social security, and inheritance 
rights, among others.  Their recognition, however, falls short in the area of 
family law, where access to adoption or assisted reproductive technologies 
is usually limited or not granted to same-sex couples. Considering that 
adoption is the main option that same-sex couples have to become parents, 
the fact that a country grants them all sorts of rights but denies them the 
access to becoming a family can make the word “almost” lose part of its 
meaning. 
The case of Australia95 presents an interesting dichotomy.  While some 
Australian jurisdictions continued to criminalize homosexual conduct 
between males until the 1990s, other states and territories had already 
begun legally to recognize and protect same-sex relationships in specific 
contexts.96  Hopes for the introduction of same-sex marriage were dashed 
when the Commonwealth in 2004 amended the Marriage Act of 1961 to 
define marriage as “the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all 
others, voluntarily entered for life.”97  This statutory definition closed the 
door to potential attempts to expand the meaning of marriage in the courts.  
Australian law at present, therefore, seems to firmly reject the notion of 
same-sex marriage.  Instead, Australia has used its existing de facto 
legislation to give same-sex couples legal protection.98  Similar to the 
Canadian approach, the direction taken by Australia has been towards the 
                                                          
2010). 
 94. Denmark Report, supra note 88, at 118. 
 95. Normann Witzleb, National Report: Australia (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Australia Report].  I want to thank Dr. Witzleb for his edits to this part of the work. 
 96. Id. at 9. 
 97. Marriage Act, 1961, § 5(1) (Austl.), available at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/ActCompilation1.nsf/0/05431B4AAF
75F0F5CA2576E8000392EA?OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
 98. Australia Report, supra note 95, at 8-16. 
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“equalization” of unmarried and married couples.  At the beginning, this 
assimilation of married and unmarried couples was aimed at heterosexual 
couples only.  Today, all states and territories have legislation that 
recognizes and protects de facto couples regardless of the sex of the 
partners.99  Also, in 2008, the Commonwealth passed comprehensive 
legislation to equalize treatment of opposite-sex as well as same-sex de 
facto couples in federal legislation.100  The characteristics of a de facto 
relationship are statutorily defined, but recognition ultimately depends on 
judicial examination of these factors on a case by case basis.101  In some 
states, de facto couples can obviate the need for individual proof by 
registering their relationship.102 
What constitutes a de facto couple varies slightly from state to state.  Dr. 
Witzleb gives a detailed account of these differences, including whether a 
certain time of cohabitation is required.103  In states with registered 
relationships, these couples enjoy full legal protection from the date of 
registration.104  Australia has gone above and beyond the Canadian model 
where unmarried couples have to prove cohabitation for some specific 
periods of time to enjoy the rights and benefits provided by law.105 
Adoption is the only area where same-sex couples are still treated 
differently from heterosexual couples.  Only the Australian Capital 
Territory and Western Australia allow same-sex couples to apply for joint 
adoption, and Tasmania allows stepchild adoption.106  Queensland passed a 
new adoption statute in 2009 allowing opposite-sex de facto couples to 
adopt but continuing to withhold this option from same-sex couples.107  
While adoption rights continue to be a sticking point in most jurisdictions, 
concerns about same-sex parenting are not pervasive.  This is evidenced by 
the fact that assisted reproductive technology is available to women 
regardless of their sexual orientation.108  Furthermore, Dr. Witzleb points 
out that, in most of Australia, the same-sex partner of a woman who has 
                                                          
 99. Id. at 9. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 7-8.  Tasmania, Victoria, New South Wales, and South Australia have 
registries, but registration is not required for the recognition of a de facto couple.  
Additionally, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) enacted the Civil Partnerships Act 
of 2008.  Id. 
 102. Id. at 11. 
 103. Id. at 12. 
 104. Id. at 11. 
 105. NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE 116 (2008). 
 106. Australia Report, supra note 95, at 25. 
 107. Adoption Act, 2009, Queensl. Stat. 2009 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/ACTS/2009/09AC029.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2010). 
 108. Australia Report, supra note 95, at 24-5. 
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undergone a fertilization procedure with her partner’s consent is legally 
recognized as the parent of her partner’s child.109 
In New Zealand, same-sex couples do not have access to marriage, but 
they are recognized through the Civil Union Act of 2004, which may apply 
to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples.110  The statute allows couples 
to transition from marriage to civil union and vice versa without the need of 
a prior divorce.111  The most important differences between marriage and 
civil unions are in the area of parental rights.  Couples registered in a civil 
union cannot jointly adopt and do not get parental rights over the child of 
the other partner.112  The distinction is not between same-sex and opposite-
sex couples but mainly between married couples and registered civil 
unions.113  At the same time, however, New Zealand has followed a similar 
direction to that of Australia by assimilating married and de facto couples.  
Unmarried couples, regardless of their sex, get recognition of property 
rights, domestic violence, tax and social security.114  There are, however, 
conflicting lower court decisions as to whether “spouses” includes 
unmarried partners too.115 
Germany follows a model similar to that of Denmark by providing a 
parallel institution exclusive to same-sex couples with limitations in the 
area of adoption.116  Dr. Jens Scherpe notes that the Regime of Life 
Partnership (ELp) enacted in 2001 was meant to be the “functional 
equivalent” of marriage.117  But, as he states, there are still important 
differences between ELp and marriage. 
Article 6 of the German Constitution protects marriage and family.118  
The German Constitutional Court (BVerfG) has interpreted this article to 
protect marriage between a man and a woman.119  It has also indicated that 
the special protection afforded to marriage only prevented the legislature 
                                                          
 109. Id. at 24. 
 110. Kenneth Norrie, National Report: New Zealand, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 265 (2011) [hereinafter New Zealand Report]. 
 111. Id. at 266-68. 
 112. Id. at 267-68; see also YUVAL MERIN, EQUALITY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES: THE 
LEGAL RECOGNITION OF GAY PARTNERSHIPS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 175 
(2002). 
 113. New Zealand Report, supra note 110, at 268. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 269-70. 
 116. Jens M. Scherpe, National Report: Germany, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 151, at 4 (2011) [hereinafter Germany Report]; see also de Groot, supra note 76, 
at 6. 
 117. Germany Report, supra note 116, at 154. 
 118. Id. at 153. 
 119. Id. (citing Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Constitutional Court], July 7, 
2009, ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS. 1164, 2007 (Ger.)). 
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from creating a legal regime that was more favourable than marriage, but it 
did not prevent the legislature from providing similar rights to other 
institutions.120  As stated in the press release in English for case 1BvR 
1164/07: 
For the authority of giving favourable treatment to marriage does not 
give rise to a requirement contained in Article 6.1 GG to disadvantage 
other ways of life in comparison to marriage. It cannot be justified 
constitutionally to derive from the special protection of marriage a rule 
that such partnerships are to be structured in a way distant from marriage 
and to be given lesser rights.121 
Given the jurisprudential development towards recognition of marriage 
as a heterosexual constitutionally protected institution, Germany opted for 
the construction of a parallel institution with no cross references to 
marriage.  The legislature wanted to give a clear sign that ELp was a 
different institution than marriage.  Despite this intention, there are more 
similarities than differences between ELp and marriage.  As Dr. Scherpe 
points out, the name of the partnership in Germany is “life partnership.”122  
The statute that created the ELp (LPartG) stated that two persons of the 
same sex establish a life partnership by declaring their will to enter into a 
partnership for life.123  The German Congress considered ELp a 
relationship intended to last for life, just as marriage is a union intended to 
last for the life of the spouses.124 
Similar to the situation of other countries reviewed here, the authority 
that can register a life partnership in Germany was also a point of debate.  
The LPartG did not establish the authority that could register life 
partnerships because this is a state regulated matter.125  More conservative 
states left the registration of ELp to public notaries or local authorities and 
kept civil registrars as the exclusive authority to provide marriage 
licenses.126 
Substantive differences between marriage and ELp are less noticeable 
today than when ELp was first enacted.  ELp even establishes kinship 
between a life partner and the family of the other partner.127  But as with 
most countries that have established parallel regimes for same-sex couples, 
                                                          
 120. Id. at 155. 
 121. Press Release, Federal Constitutional Court (Ger.), Press Office, No. 121/2009 
(Oct. 22, 2009), available at http://www.bverfg.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg09-
121en.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2010). 
 122. Germany Report, supra note 116, at 154. 
 123. Id. at 164. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 165. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 174. 
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the main restriction to civil unions under ELp is parenting.  Originally, 
Germany forbade all access to parenting for couples of the same sex.  
Today, joint adoption is still unavailable, but stepchild adoption is 
allowed.128  Same-sex couples, however, do not have access to assisted 
reproductive technologies, including surrogacy, which is completely 
forbidden in Germany.129 
Formally, Austria130 follows the original registered partnership models 
of other European countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands, and 
Norway.  Nonetheless, there are more substantive similarities with the 
situation of same-sex couples in Australia or in Germany: many rights have 
been granted but access to parenting is restricted. 
In 2003, the Austrian Constitutional Court affirmed that the legal 
definition of marriage as a union between a man and a woman was not 
unconstitutional and it did not violate the right to family set forth in Article 
12 of the European Convention of Human Rights.131  The court, however, 
recognized that same-sex couples were protected by the right to privacy 
and should be granted the same rights given to heterosexual unmarried 
couples.132  Cohabitation, therefore, should be treated equally regardless of 
the sex of the parties.  On January 1, 2010, the new Registered Partnership 
Act (“Eingetragene Partnerschaft-Gesetz,” EPG) entered into force, open 
only to same-sex couples.133  According to Professor Aichberger-Beig, 
“[t]he EPG does not contain a general reference to marriage law. . . . 
However, the provisions of the Act to a great extent are taken almost 
verbatim from marriage law.  In essence, although under a different name, 
the Act introduces marriage for same-sex couples.”134 
Many of the distinctions between marriage and registered partnership 
relate to symbolism attached to marriage.  For example, Professor 
Aichberger-Beig indicates in her report that a highly contested issue within 
the bill was the authority that would register partnerships.135  Austria 
decided to maintain a divide between marriage and registered partnerships 
                                                          
 128. See de Groot, supra note 76. 
 129. Germany Report, supra note 116, at 173; see also John A. Robertson, 
Reproductive Technology in Germany and the United States: An Essay in Comparative 
Law and Bioethics, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 189, 210 (2004). 
 130. Daphne Aichberger-Beig Report on Austria prepared by Dr.; published as 
Daphne Aichberger-Beig, Registered Partnership for Same-Sex Couples, in AUSTRIAN 
LAW―AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Bea Verschraegen ed., 2010). 
 131. Schalk v. Austria, 30141 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010). 
 132. See Aichberger-Beig, supra 130, at 65. 
 133. Id. at 68 (citing Eingetragene Partnerschaft-Gesetz [Registered Partnership 
Act], available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/lpartg/gesamt.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2010)). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 70. 
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by keeping the civil registry exclusively for marriage registration.  Except 
for large cities such as Salzburg and Vienna, partnerships must be 
registered before the district administrative authority.136 
Another difference linked to the symbolic meanings of marriage is the 
need for witnesses.  Whereas marriage requires witnesses, the EPG spared 
partnerships of this requirement.137  Even more illustrative of the weight 
that marriage carries as a symbol is the fact that paragraph 47 of the Civil 
Status Act (PStG) states that weddings “shall be concluded in a form and at 
a place suited to the significance of marriage.”138  The EPG does not 
mention anything similar to this provision. 
The rest of the differences between marriage and registered partnership 
in Austria, as it has been the common trend in different countries, relate to 
treating partnership as a family unit.  In addition to keeping parental rights 
as an exclusive prerogative of marriage, the EPG regulates the change of 
name after registration only as a “last name.”  In the case of marriage, 
instead, the PStG refers to the new last name as the “family name.”139  This 
is another example of the relevancy of symbolism.  Married couples 
become a unit called family.  Registered partners are instead two people 
associated through a legal contract with limited effects.  Consistent with 
this rationale, registered partners do not have access to joint or stepchild 
adoption.140  Assisted reproductive technologies are open to unmarried 
couples but only of different sex.141 
The PStG did not replicate marriage regulations that dealt with gender 
stereotypes.  The Austrian legislature assumed that partnership was based 
on equality between parties and did not consider it necessary to regulate in 
this area.  Instead, marriage is regulated as to insure equality between 
parties.142 
In the same tradition as Germany, the Constitution of Switzerland143 
protects the right to marry and to have a family.  Here, too, the courts have 
interpreted marriage as the union between a man and a woman.144  And just 
like in Germany and Austria, the legal recognition of same-sex couples has 
come through the enactment in 2004 of a registered partnership statute 
                                                          
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 71. 
 140. Id. at 73. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 72-73. 
 143. Annelot Peters, National Report: Switzerland, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 309 (2011) [hereinafter Switzerland Report]. 
 144. Id. at 310 (citing Tribunal Fédéral [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Mar. 3, 1993, 
119 ARRÊTS DU TRIBUNAL FÉDÉRAL SUISSE [ATF] II 264 (Switz.)). 
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applicable only to same-sex couples (LPart).145  The statute entered into 
effect in 2007.146 
The LPart assimilates registered partnership and marriage in many areas: 
inheritance rights, taxes, hospital visitation, property rights, social security, 
pensions, immigration and citizenship, tenancy, employment law, and civil 
and criminal procedure, among others.147  Registered partnerships have 
restricted access to parenting and to the symbols of marriage.  For example, 
witnesses are required for the conclusion of a marriage but not for the 
registration of a partnership.148  In the case of marriage the parties can 
adopt a common last name, but this is not possible through the LPart.149  In 
spite of these differences, registration of both marriages and partnerships 
take place before the same officers and are recorded in the same 
registries.150 
Hungary follows a similar regime to that of Germany and Switzerland, 
having established a registered civil union regime open only to same-sex 
couples in 2009.151  The Hungarian Constitution protects the institutions of 
marriage and the family and, just as the German Constitutional Court, the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court has concluded that marriage in Hungary 
means the union between a man and a woman.152 
In 2007, there was an attempt to pass a law regarding a form of civil that 
is very similar to marriage, open to both same and opposite-sex couples.153  
The Constitutional Court, however, declared the bill unconstitutional 
because it was providing opposite-sex couples with an institution 
alternative to marriage.  At the same time, it stated that a registered 
partnership for same-sex couples would be constitutional.154  In 2009, 
following the recommendations of the Constitutional Court, a new 
registered civil union law was passed, granting to same-sex couples rights 
similar to those enjoyed by married couples.155  As has usually been the 
case in other countries, including Germany, the law excluded same-sex 
                                                          
 145. Loi fédérale sur le partenariat enregistré entre personnes du même sexe 
[Federal law on the partnership recorded between people of the same sex] (Switz.), 
available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/2004/2935.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
 146. Switzerland Report, supra note 143, at 310. 
 147. A detailed account can be found in the Austria Report, supra note 130, at 5-9. 
 148. Switzerland Report, supra note 143, at 311. 
 149. Id. at 315. 
 150. Id. at 314. 
 151. András L. Pap & Zsolt Körtvélyesi, National Report: Hungary, 19 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 211, 212 (2011) [hereinafter Hungary Report]. 
 152. Id. at 215. 
 153. Id. at 212-13. 
 154. Id. at 215. 
 155. Id. at 213. 
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partners from adoption and assisted reproductive technologies.156  In 
addition to the typical restrictions to access to parenting, the law kept some 
symbols of marriage from registered civil unions.  Similar to the situation 
in Austria, the registered civil union did not allow a name change along 
with registration.157  This is clearly a matter of symbolism rather than a 
substantive rights problem because registered civil partners can follow the 
traditional name change procedure open to anyone in Hungary. 
Israel158 could be viewed as one of the countries that recognizes same-
sex couples and grants them almost all rights that married couples enjoy.  
At the same time, it could also be viewed as a country with full invisibility 
of same-sex couples.  Although it is true that Israel does not legally 
recognize same-sex couples, this is due to the fact that marriage and 
divorce are matters of personal law, regulated, therefore, by the religion of 
the parties or, in the case of foreign nationals, their nationality.159  Israel is 
more of a hybrid situation than a case of full invisibility or full recognition.  
On one hand, marriage is left to religions recognized in Israel.  On the other 
hand, civil courts have jurisdiction to hear cases of interfaith marriages or 
of people with no religion at all.160  In the latter case, marriage must take 
place abroad since no secular marriage institution exists in the country.161  
Religion is not a matter of personal choice; it depends on the rules of each 
religion, regardless of personal preferences.  Since no religion in Israel 
currently allows same-sex marriage, there can be no conclusion of same-
sex marriages in the country. 
Same-sex couples, as well as those who cannot get married due to their 
lack of religion or because both individuals belong to different religions, 
may decide to conclude their unions outside Israel.  Marriages registered 
abroad are included in the Israeli Population Registry.162  Although this 
Registry formally serves only to gather statistics, the reality is that it has 
been used as a signifier of marital status.  A Supreme Court decision in 
2006 mandated the registration of five same-sex couples married in 
Canada.163  The decision stated that registration was not indicative of the 
                                                          
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, National Report: Israel (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Israel Report]. 
 159. Id. at 1-2. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 6. 
 162. Id. at 6-7. 
 163. 3045/05 Ben-Ari v. Dir. of the Population Admin. in the Ministry of the 
Interior (2006) (Isr.) (unpublished decision), translated at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/22564351/Ben-Ari-v-%D7%92%D7%A8%D7%A1%D7% 
94-%D7%A1%D7%95%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%AA-Director-of-Population-
Administration-official-translation (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
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validity of a marriage in Israel.164  These couples, nonetheless, have access 
to the same benefits that all married couples enjoy in Israel. 165 
Another factor that makes Israel unique is that, parallel to the lack of 
civil marriage, it has gradually been granting rights, both through 
legislation and through case law, to unmarried couples or “reputed 
spouses,” along the lines of Australia or Canada.166  Requirements imposed 
on couples to be considered reputed spouses vary from one statute to 
another, but in general the definition is very flexible.167  Some statutes do 
not even require a minimum time of cohabitation or monogamy.168  Each 
specific statute or benefit can have a different scope of application.169  In 
many cases, determination of the couples that fall under the category of 
reputed spouses is a matter of interpretation.  For example, there are 
differing decisions as to whether same-sex couples fall within this concept 
for the purpose of having access to family law courts, and if the Domestic 
Violence Act applies to them or not.170  It seems to be uncontested, 
however, that same-sex couples have access to stepchild and joint adoption 
and to assisted reproductive technologies.171  Surrogacy, on the contrary, is 
open only to heterosexual couples.172 
C. Separate and unequal: Partial recognition of same-sex couples 
France, Colombia, Uruguay, and Croatia are among countries that have 
amended their systems to give formal recognition to same-sex couples, 
albeit providing them with limited rights.  In these countries, not only are 
parental rights and the symbolic nature of marriage denied to same-sex 
couples, but they also enjoy limited access to benefits including property, 
succession, and pension rights. 
In France,173 same-sex and opposite-sex couples can sign a Pacte Civil 
de Solidarité (PACS) that provide rights and obligations similar but not 
equal to marriage.174  Marriage is an exclusively heterosexual institution.175  
                                                          
 164. Israel Report, supra note 158, at 8. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 17. 
 167. Id. at 18. 
 168. Id. at 19. 
 169. See Talia Einhorn, Same-sex Family Unions in Israel Law, 4 UTRECHT L. REV. 
222, 225 (2008). 
 170. Israel Report, supra note 158, at 19-20. 
 171. Id. at 24-25. 
 172. Id. at 25. 
 173. Hugues Fulchiron, National Report: France, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 123 (2011) [hereinafter France Report]. 
 174. Id. at 123. 
 175. Id. at 125-26. 
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In 2007, the Cour de Casassion, reviewing a case of marriage annulment 
performed in Bordeaux between two individuals of the same-sex, affirmed 
that marriage in France could only exist between a man and a woman.176  
The definition of marriage in France, however, does not expressly require a 
man and a woman.177  Professor Hughes Fulchiron gives historical reasons 
for this omission: it was so evident that marriage could only take place 
between a man and a woman that there was no need for this requirement to 
be expressed in the Code Civil.178  In the Preamble of the Civil Code of 
1804, however, Portalis did state that marriage was the union between a 
man and a woman.179 
Professor Fulchiron makes a distinction between marriage and 
partnership, with the former statute covering the family and the latter 
statute covering the couple.180  This distinction would explain why the 
rights granted to couples registered under the PACS, unlike marriage, 
pertain exclusively to the relationship between the parties to the PACS and 
do not create kinship with the partner’s family.181  It would also explain the 
limited options that PACS partners would have regarding parenting; joint 
and stepchild adoption are open only to married couples.182  Assisted 
reproductive technologies are open to married, PACS, and unmarried 
couples but only of the opposite sex.183  Although stepchild adoption is not 
open to PACS couples, the Court of Cassation has been moving in the 
direction of slowly allowing a person to adopt the biological child of their 
same-sex partner.184 
Even if PACS provides legal rights to the couple, it falls short of 
recognizing rights that affect the couple only.  For example, under PACS 
the foreign partner of a French national cannot apply for French 
                                                          
 176. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] 1e civ., Mar. 3, 
2007, Bull. Civ. I, No. 511 (Fr.), available at 
http://www.courdecassation.fr/publications_cour_26/rapport_annuel_36/rapport_2007_
2640/quatrieme_partie_jurisprudence_cour_2653/droit_personnes_famille_2655/maria
ge_11311.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
 177. France Report, supra note 173, at 126. 
 178. Id. at 126. 
 179. Id. at 126, n.14. 
 180. Id. at 131. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 124. 
 183. Nancy D. Polikoff, Recognizing Partners but not Parents/Recognizing Parents 
but not Partners: Gay and Lesbian Family Law in Europe and the United States, 17 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 711, 726 (2000) (citing L-94-653 of 1994, The Bioethics Act 
(Fr.)). 
 184. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] 1e civ., July 
8, 2010, Bull. Civ. I, No. 703 (Fr.), available at http://www.courdecassation.fr/ 
jurisprudence_2/premiere_chambre_civile_568/703_8_16930.html (last visited Oct. 22, 
2010). 
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citizenship.185  The PACS does not grant intestate succession rights nor 
does it contemplate the option for the partners to change their last name.186  
It provides a very narrow framework of rights for unmarried couples, 
clearly less comprehensive than many equivalent regulations of other 
European countries. 
Colombia187 seems to follow the same rationale as Australia.  Instead of 
granting rights to same-sex couples by giving them access to marriage or 
registered partnerships, it started to assimilate married and unmarried 
heterosexual couples.  Today in Colombia there is no registered partnership 
or equivalent regime open to same-sex couples.  Marriage, as stated in the 
Constitution, is an exclusively heterosexual institution.188  In 1990, 
however, Colombia formally granted some rights to de facto heterosexual 
couples by enacting Law 54.189  The statute provided several property 
rights to de facto marital unions when cohabitation had been continuous 
and monogamous for a minimum period of two years.190  This regulation 
opened the door for the Colombian Constitutional Court to rule in 2007 that 
any rights granted to de facto opposite-sex couples under Law 54 had to be 
granted to same-sex couples as well.191  Following this decision, same-sex 
and opposite-sex couples that meet certain legal standards are considered 
de facto marital unions.192 
Although Law 54 referred only to patrimonial rights of de facto marital 
unions, today these couples enjoy additional rights in the areas of health 
care, pensions, citizenship, and criminal law, among others.193  In spite of 
this assimilation between same and opposite-sex unions, there are still 
several areas where distinctions are legally permitted.  These are especially 
apparent with regard to parenting.  Consequently, only heterosexual de 
facto marital unions are allowed to adopt children.194  There is a pending 
case before the Constitutional Court challenging the constitutionality of this 
                                                          
 185. Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, State Regulation of Sexuality in International Human 
Rights Law and Theory, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 797, 859 (2008). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Daniel Bonilla & Natalia Ramirez, National Report: Colombia, 19 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 97 (2011) [hereinafter Colombia Report]. 
 188. Id. at 100. 
 189. Law 54 of 1990, art. 1 (Colom.), available at 
http://www.dmsjuridica.com/CODIGOS/LEGISLACION/LEYES/L0054de1990.htm 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
 190. Colombia Report, supra note 187, at 98–100. 
 191. Corte Constitucional [C. C.] [Constitutional Court], febrero 7, 2007, sentencia 
C-225/95, available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2007/C-075-
07.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
 192. Colombia Report, supra note 187, at 101. 
 193. Id. at 104-06. 
 194. Id. at 101. 
27
Saez: Same-Sex Marriage, Same-Sex Cohabitation, and Same-Sex Families A
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011
SAEZ 1/24/11 3/25/2011  7:24:40 PM 
28 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 19:1 
exclusion but there is precedent from 2001 against granting adoption to 
same-sex couples.195 
Professors Bonilla and Ramirez point out that despite the recognition of 
de facto marital unions and the inclusion of same-sex couples in this 
category, many times the same officials that have to recognize these 
couples will refuse to comply with their legal mandate.196  For instance, 
public notaries may refuse to register a same-sex de facto marital union.197  
Additionally, “[w]hile government health care and pension programs have 
recognized the rights of same-sex couples, several private health care and 
pension programs have not recognized the benefits that the members of 
those same-sex couples which are part of de facto marital unions should 
receive.”198 
In the late eighties, Uruguay199 also started regulating heterosexual 
unmarried couples.  Different statutes recognized the existence of the 
“concubine” and granted rights such as compensation in cases of work 
related accidents, stepchild adoption, succession rights in special 
circumstances, and the right to make medical decisions on behalf of the 
partner, among others.200  Professor Walter Howard notes that the doctrinal 
development of de facto couples in Uruguay can be traced to 1934 with a 
decision that recognized that cohabitation had consequences that the legal 
system could not deny. 201  This recognition of cohabitation, however, did 
not, and does not, amount to the assimilation of married and unmarried 
couples, as in Canada or Australia. 
In 2007, Uruguay passed a law to regulate “concubinarian unions.”  
According to this statute, an unmarried couple, no matter their sex, identity, 
and sexual orientation or option, who has continuously lived together in a 
sexual, exclusive, monogamous, stable and permanent relationship for at 
least five years, will be considered a “concubinarian union.”202  The 
                                                          
 195. Id. (citing Corte Constitucional [C. C.] [Constitutional Court], augusto 2, 2001, 
sentencia C-814-01, available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/ 
relatoria/2001/C-814-01.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2010)). 
 196. Id. at 16. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Walter Howard, National Report: Uruguay, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 343 (2011) [hereinafter Uruguay Report]. 
 200. Id. at 358, 362–63. 
 201. Uruguay Report (Spanish version) at 13 (on file with autor) (citing L.J.U., T. V, 
case 1129, and Salvagno Campos, La sociedad de hecho en el concubinato more 
uxorio, Revista de Derecho, Jurisprudencia y Administración, T. XXXVIII, 221 
(1940)). 
 202. Uruguay Report, supra note 199, at 347; see also Law N. 18.246 of Dec. 27, 
2007, (Uru.) available at http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/leyes/ 
AccesoTextoLey.asp?Ley=18246&Anchor= (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
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definition also names restrictions on kinship, age, and state of mind.203  The 
effect of the statute is the recognition of same-sex unions that until then had 
been absolutely invisible to the Uruguayan legal system. 
De facto couples who fit the definition of a concubinarian union can 
access a set of rights established in the 2007 statute, mostly on property and 
succession rights.204  Couples that do not meet the statute’s requirement can 
still obtain limited rights recognized to unmarried couples prior to the 
establishment of this Act.205 
Among its provisions, the 2007 statute provides a more egalitarian 
regime to claim for alimony after the dissolution of the concubinarian 
union than the one provided in the case of marriage dissolution.  In the 
latter, a judge can reduce or eliminate the right to alimony of the partner 
held responsible for the dissolution of his marriage.206  The concubine’s 
right to alimony, however, is not affected by her or his responsibility in the 
dissolution of the union.207 
The concubinarian union regime in many respects mirrors marriage 
regulation but in most areas it gives limited versions of the rights that 
married couples enjoy.  Although stepchild adoption was provided to 
unmarried couples, joint adoption may be restricted to opposite-sex couples 
only.208  The statute that regulates adoption does not expressly ban same-
sex concubine unions from adoption.  Professor Howard, however, thinks 
that the spirit of the law was to restrict joint adoption to opposite-sex 
couples only.209 
Croatia,210 with its 2003 Same Sex Union Statute, is also one of several 
countries that provide some formal recognition to same-sex couples.211  
Article 61 of the Croatian Constitution states that “[t]he family shall enjoy 
special protection of the State; Marriage and legal relations in marriage, 
common-law marriage and families shall be regulated by law.”212  This text 
seems to indicate that different types of families, even those created outside 
legal marriage, enjoy constitutional protection.  Marriage, however, is still 
                                                          
 203. Law N. 18.246 at art 2. 
 204. Uruguay Report, supra note 199, at 350–51, 355. 
 205. Id. at 347. 
 206. Id. at 350. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 362-63. 
 209. Id. at 363. 
 210. Professor Nenad Hlača, National Report: Croatia (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Croatia Report]. 
 211. Law on Same Sex Civil Unions, OG RC 116/2003 (2003) (Croat.), translated 
at http://iglhrc.org/cgi-bin/iowa/article/takeaction/resourcecenter/583.html (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2010). 
 212. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, art. 61. 
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confined to opposite-sex couples.213 
According to the Same Sex Union Statute, a same-sex union is a “life 
union of two persons of the same sex (partners) who are not married, who 
are not in a heterosexual or another same-sex union, and which union lasts 
for at least three years and it is based on the principles of equality of the 
partners, of mutual respect and help, as well as on emotional ties between 
the partners.”214  The statue does not require registration of the union and it 
is limited to the regulation of “financial support between the partners, 
property rights and the right to mutual help.”215  The statute applies only to 
same-sex unions, but unmarried opposite-sex couples can access the same 
benefits through the Croatian Family Law Act.216  Same-sex couples, 
therefore, are recognized as an entity that does not fit within family law and 
are instead regulated outside the Croatian Family Law Act. 
The Czech Republic217 also provides recognition for same-sex couples, 
with a registered partnership statute of 2006 applicable exclusively to 
same-sex couples.  Section 1(1) of this statute states that “[a] registered 
partnership is a permanent association of two individuals of the same sex 
established in the manner prescribed by this law.”218  The requirements to 
enter into a registered partnership are similar to those established for 
marriage.219  The benefits, however, are more limited than those for 
marriage.  There are no inheritance rights or joint ownership comparable to 
those of married couples, there is no creation of kinship but just recognition 
that, for certain matters, the partners can act on behalf of each other.220 
Until recently, Ireland221 did not provide any formal recognition to 
same-sex couples.  The Irish Constitution protects marriage using a strong 
choice of words: “The State pledges itself to guard with special care the 
institution of Marriage, on which the Family is founded, and to protect it 
against attack.”222  This protection, although it does not expressly refer to 
                                                          
 213. Croatia Report, supra note 210, at 2. 
 214. Id. at 3 (citing Article 1 of the OG RC 116/2003). 
 215. Id. at 4. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Professor Michaela Zuklínová, National Report: Czech Republic (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Czech Report].  I would like to thank Mr. Peter Polasek for his 
assistance translating into English relevant parts of Czech’s legislation. 
 218. Zákon č 115/2006 Sb. (Czech.), available at 
http://www.epravo.cz/top/zakony/sbirka-zakonu/zakon-ze-dne-26-ledna-2006-o-
registrovanem-partnerstvi-a-o-zmene-nekterych-souvisejicich-zakonu-15257.html (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
 219. Czech Report, supra note 217, at 1. 
 220. Id. at 1-2. 
 221. Aisling Parkes, National Report: Ireland, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & 
L. 221 (2011) [hereinafter Ireland Report]. 
 222. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 41 (3.1). 
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heterosexual marriage, has been interpreted by the Irish High Court as 
requiring a man and a woman for a legal marriage.223  In July 2010, the 
President of Ireland signed the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and 
Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010.224  The new statute applies only to 
same-sex couples and it provides them with several rights such as 
household protection, succession, pension, and property rights, among 
others.225 
In Ireland, there is no formal recognition of families formed by same-sex 
couples and the Supreme Court of Ireland has recently affirmed that “there 
is no institution of a de facto family in Ireland.”226  The decision, however, 
may be interpreted as a step towards recognition of same-sex families since 
it denied custody to a biological father who was the sperm donor for a 
lesbian couple.227  The decision stated that the child lived in a “loving and 
caring situation for the child.”228 
D. The absolute divide between law and practice: The invisibility of same-
sex couples. 
A majority of countries do not give any formal recognition to same-sex 
couples.  A more in-depth review of each country, however, may reveal 
more visibility for same-sex couples than what statutes cover.  
Unfortunately, this work is limited to twenty-seven reports submitted to the 
Congress and five additional countries independently analyzed.  Among 
these reports only five are from countries where same-sex couples are 
formally invisible to their legal systems.  Their review, nonetheless, is very 
enlightening of how individuals from different cultures and places tend to 
look for alternative paths to build family ties that their systems deny them. 
Greece, Italy, and Romania are among the European Union countries 
that provide no rights to same-sex couples.  The Council of Europe and the 
ECHR encourage the recognition of same-sex couples.229  These countries, 
                                                          
 223. Zappone v. Revenue Comm’rs, [2008] 2 I.R. 417 (Ir.). 
 224. Civil Partnership Bill, 2009 (Bill No. 44b/2009) (Ir.), available at 
http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/bills/2009/4409/b44b09d.pdf (last visited 
July 16, 2010). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Ireland Report, supra note 221, at 223 (citing McD. v. L. & anor, [2009] 
I.E.S.C. 81 (12th October, 2009) (S.C.), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.ie/Judgments.nsf/60f9f366f10958d1802572ba003d3f45/a6dc
1f1e70fed713802576880031aacb?OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 22, 2010)). 
 227. Id. 
 228. McD. v. L. & anor,¶ 81(i) (granting visitation rights to the father). 
 229. See, e.g., Council Resolution A3-0028/94, Resolution on equal rights for 
homosexuals and lesbians in the EC, 1994 O.J. (C 61); Council Resolution 1728, 
Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity (Apr. 29, 2010), 
available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Other_Committees/DH-
LGBT_docs/AP_Resolution_1728_2010_en.pdf; Schalk v. Austria, 30141 Eur. Ct. 
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therefore, should soon move towards some type of recognition of same-sex 
couples, even if with limited rights. 
In Italy,230 the Constitution states that “the Republic recognizes the 
rights of the family as a natural society based on marriage.”231   There have 
been several attempts to recognize same-sex couples through registered 
partnership regimes, but all have failed.232  Although there is no general 
recognition of same-sex unions, Professor Virginia Zambrano refers to 
some regulations that grant limited protection as “family” to same-sex 
partners.  For instance, Articles 4 and 5 of Reg. N. 223/1989 define 
“family” for the exclusive purpose of gathering vital statistics.233  Article 4 
refers to “famiglia anagrafica,” a concept that would also include same-sex 
couples.  This definition has “served the purpose of creating special 
Registries (Registri delle unioni civili) aimed at conferring to cohabitants 
some administrative rights, especially social housing benefits,” including 
benefits for inmates, hospital visitations, and medical decisions, among 
others.234 
Italy follows the civil law tradition where judges are not bound by 
precedent.  This feature is apparent in the many contradictory decisions 
about the meaning of the anti-discrimination clause set forth in Article 3 of 
the Italian Constitution.235  For some judges, this clause is the basis for 
allowing same-sex unions in Italy.  For others, instead, there is no 
constitutional mandate to allow such recognition.  As an example of a 
change in these decisions, Professor Zambrano refers to the decision of a 
court in Turin where judges held that “there is no reason to distinguish 
between marriage and same-sex unions, because both have in common the 
idea of living together.”236  Regardless of different courts’ opinions, the 
                                                          
H.R. (2010). 
 230. Virginia Zambrano, National Report: Italy, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & 
L. 225 (2011) [hereinafter Italy Report]. 
 231. Art. 29 Constituzione [Const.] (It.) (“La Repubblica riconosce i diritti della 
famiglia come società naturale fondata sul matrimonio. Il matrimonio è ordinato 
sull’eguaglianza morale e giuridica dei coniugi, con i limiti stabiliti dalla legge a 
garanzia dell’unità familiare.”). 
 232. Italy Report, supra note 230, at 229–30. 
 233. Id. at 234. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Art. 3 Constituzione [Const.] (It.) (“Tutti i cittadini hanno pari dignità sociale e 
sono eguali davanti alla legge, senza distinzione di sesso, di razza, di lingua, di 
religione, di opinioni politiche, di condizioni personali e sociali. È compito della 
Repubblica rimuovere gli ostacoli di ordine economico e sociale, che, limitando di fatto 
la libertà e l’eguaglianza dei cittadini, impediscono il pieno sviluppo della persona 
umana e l’effettiva partecipazione di tutti i lavoratori all’organizzazione politica, 
economica e sociale del Paese.”). 
 236. Italy Report, supra note 230, at 235 (citing Corte d’assise Turin, sect. I, ord., 
19th novembre 1999 (It.)). 
32
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol19/iss1/1
SAEZ 1/24/11 3/25/2011  7:24:40 PM 
2011] GENERAL REPORT: WHY “SAME” IS SO DIFFERENT  33 
view of the Constitutional Court is that marriage is a union between a man 
and a woman.  In a ruling of April 14, 2010, the court stated that it was the 
prerogative of the legislature to define marriage and dismissed arguments 
from three gay couples against decisions of a Venice court and the Turin 
Court of Appeals that had also interpreted marriage as an exclusively 
heterosexual institution.237 
Professor Zambrano states that protection of same-sex couples has come 
through contractual law.238  It is common for same-sex couples to enter into 
contractual obligations to distribute property as well as care for and make 
medical decisions on behalf of each other.239  There are, however, many 
areas where contracts cannot replace the lack of public regulation.  This is 
especially true with regards to family law but it also applies to other areas 
where no recognition of the partner as a next kin relegates that person to a 
secondary role in terms of inheritance rights, pensions, and tax, to name a 
few.240 
Invisibility of same-sex couples may be more evident in Greece241 where 
its Parliament enacted in 2008 a “Free Unions Pact” that only applies to 
unmarried heterosexual partners.242  The Greek Constitution protects the 
family using language that could be interpreted as disconnected from 
marriage: “Article 21. 1. Family, being the cornerstone of the preservation 
and advancement of the Nation, as well as marriage, motherhood and 
childhood, shall be under the protection of the State.”243  According to 
Professor Alexander Fessas, this means that the Greek Constitution protects 
all types of families—not only those originated in marriage.  Additionally, 
the Greek Constitution protects marriage without defining it, and there 
seems to be no consensus as to what the constitutional protection of 
marriage covers.244  One opinion is that the Greek Constitution protects 
marriage as the Greek society understands it, including the requirement of 
opposite sex among the parties.  If this were the case, Congress could not 
redefine marriage to include same-sex couples.  A different interpretation 
indicates that marriage can be viewed as a concept “detached from social 
                                                          
 237. Matrimoni gay, no della Consulta ai ricorsi “Materia di competenza del 
Parlamento,” LA REPUBLICCA (It.), Apr. 14, 2010, available at 
http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2010/04/14/news/consulta_matrimoni_gay-3344318/. 
 238. Italy Report, supra note 230, at 239. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 236, 242-44. 
 241. Alexander G. Fessas, National Report: Greece, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 187 (2011) [hereinafter Greece Report]. 
 242. Id. at 200. 
 243. Id. at 191. 
 244. Id. at 191-92. 
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perceptions,”245 in constant evolution.  According to this interpretation, 
same-sex marriage could enjoy constitutional protection.  For now, Greece 
maintains the traditional interpretation of marriage. 
Parallel to the introduction of the Free Unions Pact (2008), the Mayor of 
Telos issued marriage licenses to two lesbian couples.  The prosecutor 
brought action against the mayor and the two couples.  The action against 
the mayor was declared inadmissible, but the court stated that in Greek 
Law there was no space for same-sex marriage.246 
In Romania,247 there is no civil union or registered partnership for 
opposite or same-sex couples, but unions registered in other European 
countries are recognized as such for purposes of entry to Romania.248  
Thus, while same-sex partners are recognized as family members of a 
European citizen for immigration purposes, no rights derived from such 
unions are recognized in the country. 
Outside the European Union, but with a special interest in joining it, 
Turkey249 is also among those countries that deny all rights to same-sex 
couples.  The Turkish Constitution does not expressly mention marriage.  It 
states that family is the foundation of Turkish society, but it does not 
provide any specific definition of marriage.250  Legally, marriage requires 
the union of a man and a woman, and no other form of civil union exists for 
opposite or same-sex couples.251  There seem to be no cases of same-sex 
couples legally challenging Turkish law.  There are, however, several 
decisions of the Court of Cassation that rule out granting rights to 
heterosexual unmarried couples because such arrangements would be 
against morality.252 
Despite this strict interpretation of the concept of marriage, Professors 
Başoğlu and Yasan believe that contract law may be used to regulate 
property between same-sex couples and that Turkish torts law allows the 
surviving same-sex partner to recover damages in case of the wrongful 
death of her partner, as long as she can prove that the deceased was her 
financial provider.253 
                                                          
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 205-06. 
 247. Professors Cristiana Craciunescu & Dan Lupascu, National Report: Romania 
(on file with author) [hereinafter Romania Report]. 
 248. Id. at 3-4. 
 249. Başak Başoğlu & Candan Yasan, National Report: Turkey, 19 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 319 (2011) [hereinafter Turkey Report]. 
 250. Id. at 320. 
 251. Id. at 321-22. 
 252. Id. at 325 (citing Decision 355/6349, 13th Civil Chamber of the Court of 
Cassation (Turk.), Apr. 24, 2006). 
 253. Id. at 325-26. 
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Turkey’s official stance on same-sex couples is very clear.  Gay 
marriage and same-sex families have expressly been rejected by the 
Turkish government.  In February 2010, several news sources reported that 
Turkey had requested a change in the Council of Europe’s declaration on 
children’s rights rejecting a drafting that would embrace diversity of 
families.254  The Turkish representative reportedly said that “[a]s a country, 
we . . . do not accept gay marriages and also we do not accept the 
institution of homosexual family parenting.”255 
Last, a very interesting case of legal invisibility of same-sex couples is 
that of Japan.256  The Japanese Constitution defines marriage as between a 
man and a woman by stating that “[m]arriage shall be based only on the 
mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through co-
operation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis.”257  Same-
sex marriage, therefore, would likely require a constitutional amendment.  
Regulation of same-sex couples through registered partnership would be 
constitutionally acceptable, but, according to Professor Teiko Tamaki, there 
have been no attempts at, nor even discussions about, recognizing rights to 
same-sex couples.258 
As with other countries where there is no recognition of rights for same-
sex couples, gay and lesbian individuals have found alternative means to 
regulate their relationships.  Just as in Italy, Japanese same-sex couples can 
enter into a contractual relationship through a notary deed.259  Another 
practice is to use adoption of one partner by the other partner to create 
kinship and family rights and obligations.260  As Professor Tamaki states, 
“[o]nce the ordinary adoption arrangement is successfully made between 
same-sex couples, they are in a parent-child relationship on the surface 
with the same legal rights enjoyed by any other natural parent-child 
relationship and adopted parent-child relationship, the mutual rights and 
duties of support and succession.”261 
This creative way of becoming family seems to be a loud secret in Japan.  
Very little has been written about this phenomenon, statistics of same-sex 
couples using adoption are nowhere to be found, and yet, Japanese people 
                                                          
 254. See, e.g., Turkey objects to gay marriage allusion in council document, DAILY 
NEWS AND ECON. REV. (Turk.), Feb. 23, 2010, available at 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-vetos-gay-marriages-2010-02-23. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Teiko Tamaki, National Report: Japan, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
251 (2011) [hereinafter Japan Report]. 
 257. KENPŌ [Constitution] art. 24. 
 258. Japan Report, supra note 256, at 255. 
 259. Id. at 260-61. 
 260. Id. at 259-60. 
 261. Id. at 259. 
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just know about this practice.  Several websites briefly explain the 
procedure, and society seems content with the status quo. 
In Japan there are two types of adoption: ordinary adoption (futsu yo-shi) 
and special adoption (tokubetsu yo-shi).262  Ordinary adoption allows an 
adult to adopt another adult.  It is a simple procedure that does not require a 
court authorization and can be requested before a municipal officer.  
Professor Tamaki points out that according to statistics, the majority of 
adoptions are of this kind, and special adoptions, which would be the 
procedure for adopting a child, amount to around 1% of all adoptions.263  
This does not mean, however, that most of these adoptions are done by 
same-sex couples.  But even if a small number of couples use this method 
of forming a family, it is still interesting how pervasive the knowledge of 
this practice is.264 
A couple that formalized their relationship through adoption stated in an 
interview for a Japanese magazine that, when they went to the municipality 
to request an adoption, the officer kept on asking why they wanted to adopt 
each other.265  They openly stated that they were lesbians and this was the 
only way officially to become a family.  One of the partners said to the 
municipal officer, “for our future security, I would like to pursue an 
adoption.”266  The officer responded, “I understand. . . . That is the only 
way under current system.”267  An adoption of this kind could be annulled 
“as harmful to public morals,”268 but there is no information about how 
many adoptions have been annulled for this reason. 
III. THE MOST RECURRENT ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE. 
There are three groups of arguments that tend to repeat in most reports.  
These can give an idea of what is considered valuable in family law.  The 
                                                          
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. For a description of both adoption and notary deeds by same-sex couples in 
Japan, see Claire Maree, Same-Sex Partnerships in Japan: Bypasses and Other 
Alternatives, 33 WOMEN’S STUDIES 541, 541-49 (2004). 
 265. Yasunobu Akasugi & Yuki Tsuchiya, Having Completed Adoption with 
Partner–After Building the Substance as a Couple, in SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIP: FOR THE 
UNDERSTANDING OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND DP LAW 52-58, (Yasunobu Akasugi, 
Yuki Tsuchiya, & Makiko Tsutsuieds eds., 2004).  Informal translation (for this paper 
only and on file with author) by Ms. Erina Miyahara, law student at Ritsumeikan 
University in Kyoto, Japan. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Akitoshi Yanagihashi, Towards Legal Protection for Same-Sex Partnerships in 
Japan: From the Perspective of Gay and Lesbian Identity, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF 
SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 353 (Mads Andenas & Robert Wintemute eds., 2001). 
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first group of arguments contain an ontological claim that marriage is what 
it is and cannot be a different thing.  The second group of arguments can be 
identified as teleological, looking at the meaning or purpose of marriage.  
The third group of arguments refer to marriage as a symbol and many times 
are neither ontological nor teleological, but are simply formalistic. 
A. The essentialist arguments 
Professors Martinez de Aguirre Aldaz and De Pablo Contreras advance 
this type of argument by claiming that the correct interpretation of Article 
32 of the Spanish constitution should have not led to the authorization of 
same-sex marriage.269  In their opinion, the grammatical interpretation of 
this article should take the constitutional interpretation from the Dictionary 
of the Royal Academy of the Spanish Language, where marriage is defined 
as a long term union between a man and a woman.270  The word 
“marriage,” therefore, would require a man and a woman.  This argument 
would be reaffirmed by looking at the etymology of the word matrimony, 
which comes from the Latin “Matri,” meaning “mother,” and “Mony” or 
“Monium,” meaning “status, role, or function.”271  They argue, therefore, 
that matrimony is a concept intrinsically linked to becoming a mother and 
the possibility of procreation. 
In the opinion of Professors Martinez de Aguirre and De Pablo 
Contreras,  
[i]f the union is between two men or two women it is then not marriage, 
but rather another different human and social phenomenon, for the same 
reason that the sale of something for no money is not a sale but a 
donation, and saying that a donation is not a sale is not pejorative against 
the donation, but simply defining substantially different truths, subject to 
different legal treatment.272 
A similar argument can be found in the French report.  Professor 
Fulchiron states that, in the core of the definition of marriage, the 
difference of sex is embedded in culture.273  He claims that, even beyond 
the Judeo-Christian culture, marriage has historically been conceived of as 
a union between a man and a woman, regardless of each society’s 
acceptance or non-acceptance of homosexuality.274 
According to these arguments, there was no need to define marriage as 
                                                          
 269. Spain Report, supra note 16, at 294. 
 270. Id. at 294-95. 
 271. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1186, 1247 (2d ed. 
1982). 
 272. Spain Report, supra note 16, at 295. 
 273. France Report, supra note 173, at 129. 
 274. Id. 
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between a man and a woman because it was structurally required to have 
two sexes for it to exist as such.  The reports for Portugal, Greece, Italy, 
and Uruguay rely on what is known in the civil law tradition as “the theory 
of the inexistence” to explain why the lack of two opposite sex individuals 
in a marriage contract did not make that contract null, but rather 
inexistent.275  The theory of the inexistence was adopted in Article 146 of 
the French Civil Code for the case of lack of consent.276  It has been used 
by legal scholars to explain that a marriage between two individuals of the 
same-sex would be inexistent too.277  Professors Martinez de Aguirre and 
De Pablo Contreras give the example of a sales contract.278  If there is no 
price to be paid, the sales contract is not null; it does not exist as a sales 
contract and it exists as a donation.  Same-sex marriage, according to this 
theory, would not be a marriage, but something different that needs to be 
named differently.  That was also the position taken by court in Italy to 
justify its holding that, in Italy, though not expressly established by the 
Civil Code, marriage is a union between a man and a woman.  Professor 
Zambrano explains that the rationale of the court was that “[t]he fact that 
the Italian legislator, in establishing the eligibility conditions for marriage 
did not make any reference to the difference of sex was interpreted by these 
judges as the proof that same-sex marriage must be seen as non-existent 
(inesistente) at all.”279  Another example of the ontological position is 
Section 1 of the Michigan Marriage Protection Act of 1996: “Marriage is 
inherently a unique relationship between a man and a woman . . . .”280 
Professor Duarte mentions in his report that marriage between two 
individuals of the same-sex was inexistent in Portugal before last May.281 
Now, same-sex marriage exists and it is legal.282  If the argument on the 
nature of things is right, it would be irrelevant that same-sex marriage was 
legal in Portugal, or in Spain, or in any other country.  All these countries 
would be mistaken by calling marriage something that is not marriage.  If 
                                                          
 275. See HENRY CAPITANT, INTRODUCTION A L’ETUDE DU DROIT CIVIL: NOTIONS 
GENERALES 250-51 (1898). 
 276. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] Article 146 (Fr.) (“Il n’y a pas de mariage lorsqu’il n’y a 
point de consentement.”). 
 277. For a brief account on the theory of the inexistence, see Ricardo Victor 
Guarinoni, “De lo que no hay. La Inexistencia Jurídica” Cuadernos de Filosofía del 
Derecho (Spain), Doxa  N. 25, 2002, 637-53.  Reference to the use of the theory of 
inexistence in the context of same-sex marriage in Germany can be found in W. 
Müller-Freienfels, Family Law and the Law of Succession in Germany, 16 INT’L & 
COMP. L. QUART. 431 (1967). 
 278. Spain Report, supra note 16, at 295. 
 279. Italy Report, supra note 232, at 247-48 (referring to Trib. Latina (It.), 10th June 
2005). 
 280. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 551.1 (2007) (emphasis added). 
 281. Portugal Report, supra note 48, at 2. 
 282. Id. 
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things are what they are and not a different thing, then it would not be 
possible for the law to order them to be something different. 
There are three different options with regards to the ontological 
argument.  The first option is to take the position that countries that have 
passed same-sex marriage laws have made a conceptual mistake.  Under 
this argument, countries where marriage is a union between a man and a 
woman should not recognize any effects to same-sex marriage because it is 
not a real marriage.  Each country may decide to call a same-sex union a 
marriage and give it the effects of marriage, but because it is structurally 
not a marriage, no one should be forced to recognize such a union as 
marriage.  This position is not necessarily incompatible with believing in 
the recognition of rights for same-sex couples, but only with the option of 
opening up marriage to same-sex couples.  There is, nonetheless, a stronger 
version of this argument that is incompatible with same-sex unions in 
general.  The stronger version is usually based on a faith argument that 
cannot be disputed because it goes beyond rationality.  Some reports 
tangentially touched on religious bases for regulating marriage, but the 
religious argument was not thoroughly advanced by any.  I will not refer to 
this argument here since no report elaborated on these types of 
arguments.283 
The second option is to argue that it is a mistake to affirm that different 
sex is essential to marriage.  Marriage could be defined as a union between 
individuals emotionally tied to each other.  Even if, historically, the most 
common definition of marriage has required two individuals of different 
sexes, it would be possible to argue that marriage remains a marriage if 
more than two people enter into a relationship, or if people of the same-sex 
do so.  Professor Fulchiron states that polygamy and same-sex relationships 
are not the same variables in the conceptualization of marriage.284  
Polygamy is marriage, although not accepted by French law, but same-sex 
marriage is not.285 
                                                          
 283. For an overview of such arguments, see John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and 
“Sexual Orientation,” 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049, 1062-63 (1994):  
At the heart of the Platonic-Aristotelian and later ancient philosophical 
rejections of all homosexual conduct, and thus of the modern “gay” ideology, 
are three fundamental theses: (1) The commitment of a man and woman to 
each other in the sexual union of marriage is intrinsically good and reasonable, 
and is incompatible with sexual relations outside marriage. (2) Homosexual 
acts are radically and peculiarly non-marital, and for that reason intrinsically 
unreasonable and unnatural. (3) Furthermore, according to Plato, if not 
Aristotle, homosexual acts have a special similarity to solitary masturbation, 
and both types of radically non-marital acts are manifestly unworthy of the 
human being and immoral. 
 284. France Report, supra note 173, at 138. 
 285. Id. 
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The question is, then, what is essential to marriage?  Indisputably, it 
requires the participation of at least two individuals.  One person alone 
cannot marry.  It also requires that all parties to the marriage be recognized 
as individuals by a legal system, but it is still marriage if some of the 
parties to a marriage are legally treated as individuals of lesser value.  Also, 
most legal systems today pose some restrictions on kinship.  Are these 
restrictions essential to marriage?  Does marriage require sexual activity 
between the parties?  Does it require emotional support between the 
parties?  There are conflicting answers to these questions and greater issues 
about family, citizenship, and moral values lie behind each position. 
In theory, there can be essentialist arguments in favor of same-sex 
marriage, but essentialists are found primarily on the side of heterosexual 
marriage advocates. 
The third option is to reject essentialism completely and argue that the 
concept of marriage can mutate from one thing to another.  In other words, 
the law would have the power to define legal concepts.  Marriage, thus, 
may have been a union between a man and a woman but it can now be a 
union between two individuals of any sex.  Marriage can be a union 
between several men and one woman, or it can be a union between several 
women and one man, or any combination in between. 
It seems that legal systems define and redefine things rather often.  Law 
defines, for legal purposes, life and death.  In the Catholic tradition, many 
women and men baptize the unborn dead fetus and give the fetus a 
Christian burial.286  They talk about their dead son or daughter, and in their 
hearts and minds, they lost a child.  In most Western traditions, however, a 
dead fetus was never a person.  The same happens with death.  Law defines 
the moment of death even if for religious purposes, or even by medical 
standards, the person may still be alive.  Neither does law take into account 
a deceased’s soul for any purposes.  Historically, personhood has been 
legally defined and redefined, sex has been defined and redefined, and 
many other concepts have been created by laws only to be recreated by 
different laws.  Marriage, therefore, could change too.  But there are limits 
to the process of definition and redefinition, and legal marriage must keep 
some relation to the social understanding of marriage.  At the same time, all 
legal definitions must respect a framework of human rights.  With these 
restrictions in mind, it would be possible to redefine marriage to include 
other unions such as those between same-sex couples. 
                                                          
 286. See DIOCESE OF SAN DIEGO, OFFICE FOR LITURGY AND SPIRITUALITY, 
GUIDELINES FOR CATHOLIC FUNERAL RITES, 1, available at http://www.diocese-
sdiego.org/Handbook/Handbook_PDFs/Liturgy8.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2010). 
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B. The teleological arguments 
A second set of arguments that recur in the reports, as well as in general 
literature about marriage, relates to the purposes of marriage, or more 
specifically, the purpose of the state protection of marriage.  Many reports 
assert that refusal to recognize rights to same-sex couples have been based 
on a belief that the state has an interest in protecting heterosexual couples 
as the only units capable of procreating.  That would be the fundamental 
difference between a couple where both parties are of the same-sex and one 
where they are of different sexes.  It is not the fact that the opposite-sex 
couples will procreate or that in a particular union the goal will be to 
procreate.  It is the general interest of the state to protect associations that 
will secure procreation.  This argument was used in Canada before they 
granted full recognition of same-sex marriage.  The Supreme Court of 
Canada stated then that marriage’s “ultimate raison d’être . . . is firmly 
anchored in the biological and social realities that heterosexual couples 
have the unique ability to procreate, that most children are the product of 
these relationships, and that they are generally cared for and nurtured by 
those who live in that relationship.”287  In Belgium, this was also an 
important argument against the recognition of same-sex marriage.288 
A more complex teleological argument is one that links marriage to 
family in general.  The purpose of marriage would not only be to ensure 
procreation but also to protect family in general by maintaining marriage as 
the exclusive option to create kinship outside consanguinity.  Marriage 
creates parents who are linked to their children and are also linked to the 
families of their spouses. 
These two reasons are the ones that make Professor Fulchiron affirm that 
in France, marriage covers the family and PACS is intended to cover the 
partnership.289  Marriage would be naturally linked to procreation and to 
family.  This is not the case for same-sex couples, who are not naturally 
linked to procreation. 
The question behind the teleological arguments is what the meaning of 
legal marriage is.  Why would a country protect some types of associations 
over others?  Historically, marriage has served several distinct purposes 
that range from controlling women, controlling sex, controlling offspring, 
to controlling property, among others.290  Before the rise of DNA tests, 
                                                          
 287. Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 515 (Can.). Professor Bureau states in the 
Canada Report, supra note 25, that this argument was then abandoned in other 
decisions such as EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada, [2003] 13 B.C.L.R.2d  1 (Can. B.C. 
Ct. App.).   
 288. Belgium Report, supra note 10, at 62. 
 289. France Report, supra note 173, at 132. 
 290. In medieval Europe, marriage was “an institution by which men were 
confirmed as the masters of their wives on religious and legal grounds. But it was also 
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marriage was the most efficient signaling of paternity, and the most 
efficient tool, therefore, to claim alimonies from estranged or irresponsible 
fathers. 
Gradually, different countries have relaxed their rules regarding 
parenting, but have kept marriage as the ideal of family formation.  
Countries reviewed for this report show a tension between equality and 
family rights.  Portugal even redefined marriage but was unable to provide 
adoption rights and access to parenting to same-sex couples.291  Countries 
such as Denmark or the Netherlands were also hesitant to open the door to 
parenting to same-sex couples, and many countries seem to be ready to 
equalize all aspects of a same-sex relationship with all aspects of marriage 
but parenting. 
There is a recurrent tension between the right to privacy and the right to 
family.  We learn from Professor Aichberger-Beig that the right to private 
life guaranteed in Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
was used by the Austrian Constitutional Court in its decision to treat 
unmarried couples of opposite or same-sex equally.292  Countries that 
accept same-sex unions have done so by recognizing that individuals have 
the right to engage in relationships of their desire.  This right, however, 
seems to end when it clashes with the right to family.  Professors Swennen 
and Leleu state that the constitutional challenge to the legal recognition of 
same-sex marriage in Belgium was based in part on the idea that the law 
was assimilating different situations: on one hand, people who wish to start 
a family with a person of the opposite sex, and, on the other, people who 
wish to enter into a cohabitation regime with a person from the same-sex.293  
The claim implies that individuals would have a right to form a partnership 
with whomever they wish, but that this would be a different situation than 
wishing to form a family, which could only be done by individuals of 
opposite sexes. 
The ECHR has used this approach to encourage European countries to 
recognize rights to same-sex couples, and, at the same time, maintain that 
marriage is still a heterosexual institution.  Article 8 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights protects the right to private and family life, 
whereas Article 12 protects the right to marry and to found a family.294  
                                                          
a union intended to provide for the well-being of both parties and eventually their 
children. At the peasant level marriage was largely an economic arrangement . . . . A 
bride’s dowry consisting of money, goods, animals, or land was essential to the 
founding of a new household.” MARILYN YALOM, A HISTORY OF THE WIFE 47 (2001). 
 291. Portugal Report, supra note 48, at 2. 
 292. Austria Report, supra note 130, at 3. 
 293. Belgium report, supra note 10, at 66. 
 294. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 8 and 12, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
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Professor Norrie states that the ECHR has been hesitant to use the “right to 
family life” of Article 8 to decide cases that involve sexual orientation 
claims.  Instead, it has focused its attention on the “right to private life” of 
the same Article.295   This is confirmed by the ECHR: “Court’s case-law 
has only accepted that the emotional and sexual relationship of a same-sex 
couple constitutes ‘private life’ but has not found that it constitutes ‘family 
life,’ even where a long-term relationship of cohabiting partners was at 
stake.”296  The same decision, however, changes the direction of the ECHR 
by accepting that European countries have evolved towards the recognition 
of same-sex relations as a form of family life, although still affirms that 
there is no violation of the right to marry and found a family when 
European countries restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples.297 
There are additional teleological arguments in favor of same-sex 
marriage.  The exposition of reasons to introduce same-sex marriage 
(Exposé des motifs) in the Belgian bill stated that “in our contemporary 
society, marriage is lived and felt as a (formal) relationship between two 
people, whose primary goal is the creation of a lasting cohabitation . . . . 
Today, the purpose of marriage is essentially to show and affirm the 
intimate relationship between two people, and marriage loses its 
procreative character, there is no reason not to expand marriage to same-
sex persons.”298 
The argument that the state must protect marriage because of its 
procreative nature may be the strongest argument against same-sex 
marriage.  The state, after all, has an interest in ensuring that new citizens 
will be born. It has an interest also in ensuring that these new citizens will 
be raised in loving environments.  At the same time, states also have an 
interest in protecting their own citizens from discrimination and providing 
an environment that tends toward the pursuit of happiness and self 
realization.  Is it necessary to restrict one in order to protect the other?  Is 
restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples the least harmful means to 
protect procreation?  And is it the most effective way to do so? 
C. Marriage as symbol, but of what? 
Several reports refer to the importance of marriage as a symbol, 
“[s]omething used for or regarded as representing something else.”299  With 
marriage, states are protecting something beyond the solemn act of 
marriage.  Nonetheless, it seems that in some cases the symbol has 
                                                          
 295. U.K. Report, supra note 77, at 336. 
 296. Schalk v. Austria, 30141 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 94 (2010). 
 297. Id. ¶ 101. 
 298. Belgium Report, supra note 10, at 68 (citation omitted). 
 299. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY, supra note 271, at 1926. 
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transcended the idea or thing that it was meant to represent becoming at the 
same time the signifier and the signified. 
Professor Witzleb states, regarding Australia, that “[s]ame-sex marriage 
is generally no longer needed to achieve equal entitlements and protection 
before the law.  The inequality now lies predominantly in withholding from 
gay men and lesbians the possibility of giving status to their relationship 
through an official act celebrating and confirming the existence of that 
relationship.”300  In South Africa, the Marriage Act remained intact and a 
different institution, also called marriage but under a different act, was 
created.301 
Registration authority and name change have been recurrent concerns in 
countries passing registered partnership or civil union regulations.  
Whether the authority that can register same-sex partners (or partners in 
general) will be the same one that registers marriages was an issue in 
Denmark and Austria.302  In Germany, those states that opposed ELp left 
registration to public notaries instead of giving it to the same authority that 
registers marriages.303  In Hungary, name change was not allowed for 
registered partners.304  In Austria, registered partnership contemplates the 
option of name change, but, as opposed to marriage, the new statute did not 
refer to this new name as “family name.” 305 
The use of marriage primarily as a symbol is found in countries that have 
created parallel institutions to marriage via registration or recognition of 
cohabitation and have granted these unions the same rights enjoyed by 
married couples.  The United Kingdom and, to great extent, Australia are 
good examples of this model.306  If married and unmarried couples or 
registered partners enjoy the same benefits, rights, and obligations, the only 
added value provided to married couples is a social signifier of their status.  
As a social signal, the act of marriage is twofold: it facilitates the matching 
process by acting as a prima facie guarantee of commitment, and it is a sign 
to the rest of society that the relationship between two individuals has an 
expectancy of a long-term commitment.307   But why would the State have 
to facilitate this process for some groups only?  It seems that either 
marriage must stand for something more substantive than a social signifier, 
                                                          
 300. Australia Report, supra note 95, at 12. 
 301. South Africa Report, supra note 33, at 280. 
 302. Denmark Report, supra note 88, at 117; Austria Report, supra note 130, at 6-7. 
 303. Germany Report, supra note 116, at 166. 
 304. Hungary Report, supra note 151, at 213. 
 305. Austria Report, supra note 130, at 7. 
 306. U.K. Report, supra note 77, at 334; Australia Report, supra note 95, at 6-7. 
 307. See Robert Rowthorn, Marriage as a Signal, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 141 (Anthony W. Dnes & Robert Rowthorn eds., 2002). 
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or it may well surrender to the fact that it is the standing façade of an old 
structure that with time has ceded. 
If the purposes of marriage—the signified—have lost meaning, the 
signifier loses meaning too. In those countries where access to parenting is 
fully restricted to heterosexual married couples, the symbolic nature of 
marriage makes sense because there is a direct correlation between symbol 
and purpose: procreation within marriage.  Regardless of whether this norm 
is fair, the symbolism and the substantive objectives behind it are tied 
together.  For example, today marriage makes sense in Romania where 
only heterosexual couples can marry and no one but married couples can 
form co-parental families.308  This, however, is not a statement about the 
appropriateness of the substantive norm that marriage protects.  It may well 
be that the reasons that lie behind marriage in a particular country do not 
conform to current standards of treatment of individuals in the eyes of 
international law or in the eyes of the country’s own constitutional values.  
It can also mean that in practical terms marriage is not fulfilling the 
purpose that it was meant to carry out.  This would be the case, for 
example, of a country whose statutes recognize only heterosexual married 
couples, but the number of out-of-wedlock children is almost as large as or 
larger than the number of children born within marriages. In cases where 
the purpose of marriage fails, so should the symbol. 
Marriage as a symbol can also be analyzed from a different perspective, 
as the need for legal systems to rely on forms.  This is simply the formalist 
feature of the law. Atiyah and Summers state that legal reasoning can be 
formal or substantive. Substantive reasons are those based on “moral, 
economic, political, institutional or other social consideration[s].”309  They 
“serve as primary ingredients of most constitutions, statutes, precedents, 
and other legally recognized phenomena . . . which give rise to formal 
reasoning.”310   Formal reasons give judges the power to decide on the 
bases of a rule that usually excludes any other consideration.  “Unlike a 
substantive reason, a formal reason necessarily presupposes a valid law or 
other valid legal phenomenon, such as a contract or a verdict.” 311 
Formal reasons presuppose that someone else, at a different level, has 
already weighed all substantive reasons that could be behind the signifier 
that will replace all other reasons.  In this sense, a formal reason has to be 
created taking into account substantive objectives that the legal system 
                                                          
 308. Romania Report, supra note 247, at 5. 
 309. P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND 
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 5 (1987). 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. at 2. 
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wants to protect.  The age requirements to exercise the right to vote or to 
obtain a driver’s license are examples of formal reasons.  Just like voting 
age, marriage would be “a formal reason for making many decisions.”312  
As Atiyah points out, marriage is used as a formal reason to allocate 
resources, define entitlements, and provide benefits.  In his opinion, “[s]o 
many different questions arise about how we are to treat two parties in 
some sort of relationship that it is exceedingly convenient and cost-
effective to make the answers turn uniformly on one simple formal 
proposition.  Are they married or not?”313  Formal reasons, however, must 
change when the substantive reasons that support them change.  Marriage 
used to be evidence of meaningful relationships of one type.  Once 
societies start accepting other meaningful relationships, either these 
relationships are also included in the formal reason by expanding marriage 
or the formal reason loses all meaning. It is no longer efficient for the 
system to rely on that particular formal marker.  Judges often find 
themselves reviewing a claim that a certain benefit, or a certain share of 
property, should be granted to the plaintiff as if she were in possession of a 
marriage certificate that she does not actually have.  Individuals urge 
judges not to look at the formality—the existence of a marriage 
certificate—but to the substantive reasons that lie behind it. 
Marriage used as a legal formal reason is a great argument for expanding 
the concept of marriage to same-sex couples.  It reduces claims in courts 
from gay and lesbian partners requesting the right to hospital visitations, 
the right to pension benefits, or the right to succession.  The formality of 
marriage, on the contrary, works against assimilation of married and 
unmarried couples.  A system where different forms of association may 
qualify for legal recognition is certainly more complex than one that 
attaches rights to a marriage certificate.  Nonetheless, Atiyah’s assertion 
that “special rules for long-term cohabitants and also for intending long 
term cohabitants would be an immensely costly and troublesome 
business”314 has already been put to the test in Canada, Australia, and the 
United Kingdom, among others.  None of the reports have referred to 
complications, if any, that the change in their regulations may have brought 
to the adjudicative process. 
All countries that have opened their legal systems to include same-sex 
couples as legitimate associations worthy of recognition (partial or total), 
have done so after their systems were challenged in court by same-sex 
couples.  These trials have been specific to a particular right, as in 
Colombia, or they have been directly aimed at claiming the right to marry, 
                                                          
 312. P.S. ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 105 (1986). 
 313. Id. at 107. 
 314. Id. 
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as in South Africa.  In countries where same-sex couples are invisible in 
legal statutes, they are very much visible in courts.  Judges following their 
countries’ formal signifiers may deny rights to same-sex couples, but these 
claims show a reality that clashes with the legal construction of emotional 
associations chosen by such country.  What the national reports reviewed 
here show is that the formality of marriage is often outweighed by 
substantive reasons in courts. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In recent months, this report had to be redrafted several times due to 
changes that were taking place in Portugal, Iceland, Mexico, Argentina, 
and in the United States.  As I write this report, Spain’s Constitutional 
Tribunal is considering a challenge to their same-sex marriage statute,315 
and bills establishing civil unions are being considered in several 
countries.316  The fast pace of these changes in countries with different 
legal traditions and cultures is a sign that family law is changing.  Whether 
scholars and political scientists agree with the direction that family law is 
taking, it is undeniable that there is a movement towards the recognition of 
same-sex couples as family units, at least in Europe and in the Americas.  
Same-sex marriage, however, is not yet the common type of recognition.  
Instead, countries have accommodated same-sex couples into their legal 
systems almost as a tacit admission that same-sex cohabitation happens, 
and it has legal consequences that must be regulated.  In countries with no 
recognition of same-sex couples, gay and lesbian couples exist and find 
ways of accommodating at least their basic partnership needs within their 
legal systems.  What we know of Italy and Japan must be also true in other 
countries where couples use contract law to find the security that is 
formally denied to them. 
These changes in family law pose several challenges, at a local and 
international level.  Among these challenges, three can be directly drawn 
from the country reports reviewed for this work.  The first challenge is the 
                                                          
 315. Spain Report, supra note 16, at 391. 
 316. See Chilean Bill Would Create Civil Unions for Gay Couples, ON TOP 
MAGAZINE, June 16, 2010, available at 
http://ontopmag.com/article.aspx?id=5878&MediaType=1&Category=24.  Costa 
Rica’s Congress is discussing a bill on civil unions for same-sex couples, but on 
August 14, 2010 the Costa Rican Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional a 
ballot initiative supported by religious groups to oppose the bill.  See  Costa Rica dice 
no a referendo sobre uniones gay, EL PARADIARIO (Costa Rica),Aug. 14, 2010, at 14, 
available at http://www.elparadiario14.cl/admin/render/noticia/20610. Colombia’s 
Constitutional Court recently declined to decide on the constitutionality of restricting 
marriage to heterosexual couples.See Corte aplaza derechos de las parejas del mismo 
sexo, COLOMBIA DIVERSA (Colom.), available at 
http://www.colombiadiversa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=848 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2011). 
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relationship between international private law and family law, the second 
relates to parenting, and the final challenge is the role that international 
courts play in family law structures. 
One of the main obstacles that same-sex marriage and registered 
partnership regimes face in a global world is the recognition of these 
unions by different countries.  The variety of legal regimes for same-sex 
couples will most likely trigger a global change in international private law.  
Some countries have established rules about how to treat same-sex 
marriages or partnerships performed or recognized abroad.  The 
governments of most countries, however, have not addressed this issue yet.  
For a same-sex couple, the uncertainty of whether their relationship will be 
recognized abroad creates a major difference from opposite-sex couples.  
As long as the majority of countries still define marriage as a union 
between a man and a woman, a lesbian couple married in Belgium will be 
less willing to move overseas than a heterosexual couple.  At a minimum, 
same-sex couples thinking of relocation have to weigh arguments that 
heterosexual couples do not have to consider to make a decision.  Professor 
de Groot’s account of international private law and same-sex couples 
provides complete information on this field.317  There is no question, 
however, that as family law evolves, private international law is forced to 
evolve too. 
Another challenge that countries face is access to parenthood by same-
sex couples.  In some countries, the redefinition of marriage as open to 
same and opposite-sex couples has meant that not all marriages are the 
same.  In those countries, as in Portugal, marriage is no longer one single 
institution, but two different institutions that use the same name.  In a way, 
redefining marriage in those terms is like redefining citizenship and having 
one group of citizens with the right to vote and another group without it.  Is 
a country really granting citizenship if a traditional feature of citizenship 
such as the right to vote is not included?  Marriage without access to 
parenting bears a resemblance to citizenship without voting rights.  
Countries that have opted for this model of “amputated marriage”—as 
some scholars called it in Belgium318—did so knowing that this was a 
transitional political compromise and that full access to parenting would 
soon follow. 
As evident from the country reports reviewed above, countries have 
moved from strict regulations where only children born within marriage 
were recognized as legitimate and had access to rights, to regimes where no 
difference or very little difference is made between children born within 
                                                          
 317. De Groot, supra note 76. 
 318. Belgium Report, supra note 10, at 65. 
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marriage and out of wedlock.  Countries have also moved from strict 
adoption laws where only married couples could adopt children to systems 
in which single individuals can also become adoptive parents.  Once 
parenting is recognized outside marriage, it is difficult to maintain 
privileges for only one model of parenting.  This is even more apparent 
with the rise of the best interest of the child principle as a standard of 
adjudication, and the strengthening of the right to family to all individuals.  
At least, prima facie, it is in the best interest of the child to recognize 
parental rights to the partner of the biological mother, whether they are a 
married couple or not.  The reports reviewed here have shown that in many 
countries the right to family is not only legally undefined, but socially there 
are different interpretations of what it means.  Families are formed with or 
without the state’s blessing. 
The complexity of biology must be added to the complexity of adoption 
regulation.  Today, procreation is possible in ways unthinkable fifty years 
ago.  If contraception made it possible for women to choose if or when to 
have children, assisted reproductive technologies have made it possible for 
women to choose their family structure.  Single women can decide to have 
a child alone, and lesbian couples can decide to become mothers, all 
without emotional ties and even with anonymous sperm donors.  In 
addition to the variety of assisted reproductive technologies, surrogacy is 
now a reality that opens up the possibility for gay male couples to become 
fathers too.  As stated in this report, some countries treat assisted 
reproductive technologies as a health issue open to all women regardless of 
their sexual orientation and marital status.319  Other countries restrict these 
technologies to married couples or to heterosexual couples.320  Surrogacy is 
forbidden in many countries, others forbid it only if for profit, and other 
jurisdictions allow it completely.321  Today there are many more alternative 
ways to forma family than in past generations.  Until recently, it was up to 
each country to determine if the legal concept of family and the social 
concept of family would coincide or not.  In today’s culture of universal 
human rights and international legal regulation, this may not be an 
exclusively national prerogative.  The ECHR reinforces this idea in its 
decision Schalk v. Austria. Although the ECHR was not willing to 
recognize that under the European Convention of Human Rights there was 
a right for same-sex couples to marry, it did change its past interpretation 
by recognizing to same-sex couples a right to family life.322 
This is precisely the third challenge that countries are facing with regards 
                                                          
 319. This is the case of Denmark.  See Denmark Report, supra note 88, at 119. 
 320. See, e.g., Israel Report, supra note 158, at 19-20. 
 321. See, e.g., Germany Report, supra note 116, at 173. 
 322. Schalk v. Austria, 30141 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 94 (2010). 
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to family law.  The “national” has become “international,” and family law 
is not isolated from this phenomenon.  Traditionally, family law has been 
treated as a local construction that, although regulated by law, transcends 
its legal conceptualization to ultimately reflect the most intimate cultural 
values of a nation.  For a long time, international law was seen as unrelated 
to family law.  This was reasonable given that families were also shielded 
from local legal intervention.  As inequalities within the family structure 
have been uncovered, countries have allowed more legal intervention 
within the family.  International law started to intervene when family law 
issues were presented as human rights issues.  In the Americas, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights decided that Guatemala was in violation 
of the American Convention on Human Rights for requiring women to 
have the authorization of their husbands to work outside the house,323 and 
the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights decided that Brazil had 
violated the American Convention on Human Rights by allowing domestic 
violence to go unpunished.324  In Europe, the ECHR has decided cases that 
allow gay fathers to have custody of their children325 and lesbian women to 
adopt children.326 
International systems of protection of human rights have evolved from a 
role of guarantors of a minimal treatment of respect of human rights to a 
role of authentic interpreters of the concepts of human rights.  With this 
new role, its involvement in shaping family law is inevitable.  The Schalk 
case, recently decided by the ECHR, provides a good example of the 
current intervention of international courts in family law.  The ECHR 
denied that a heterosexual definition of marriage amounts to 
discrimination, but it left the door open to revisit this decision as European 
countries evolve towards more comprehensive definitions of marriage.327  
The decision shows that the ECHR sees itself in a secondary role by 
waiting for the states to make the first move towards recognition of same-
sex marriage.  In other areas, however, as noted above, the court has not 
been willing to wait for a cultural change.  Certain rights, after all, are 
outside the democratic process.  Marriage, for now, is not one of them, at 
least in Europe. 
The analysis of same-sex couples in different countries shows unease in 
this area.  Changes will keep coming and tensions within countries and 
among countries regarding same-sex couples will continue.  It seems that 
                                                          
 323. Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
Report No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. at 704 (2000). 
 324. Id. at 16. 
 325. Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 47 (1999). 
 326. E.B. v. France, 47 Eur. Ct. H.R. 21 (2008). 
 327. Id. ¶ 105. 
50
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol19/iss1/1
SAEZ 1/24/11 3/25/2011  7:24:40 PM 
2011] GENERAL REPORT: WHY “SAME” IS SO DIFFERENT  51 
the statement made by Mr. Martin Cauchon as Minister of Justice and 
Attorney General of Canada in 2002 is still very much pertinent: 
Not just in Canada but around the world, individuals and their 
governments have debated whether marriage has a continuing value to 
society, and if so whether and how the state should recognize married 
relationships in law. The Canadian public, like those in many other 
countries, are divided on this question. Some feel strongly that 
governments should continue to support marriage as an opposite-sex 
institution, since married couples and their children are the principal 
social unit on which our society is based. Others believe that, for reasons 
of equality, governments should treat all conjugal relationships—
opposite-sex and same-sex—identically. Still others believe that in a 
modern society, governments should cease to recognize any one form of 
relationship over another and that marriage should be removed from the 
law and left to individuals and their religious institutions.328 
                                                          
 328. MARIN CAUCHON, DEP’T OF JUSTICE OF CAN., MARRIAGE AND LEGAL 
RECOGNITION OF SAME SEX UNIONS (Nov. 2002), available at 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/dept-min/pub/mar/mar.pdf. 
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ANNEX 
18E CONGRES INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARE                    
18TH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON COMPARATIVE LAW 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2010 
DROIT CIVIL / CIVIL LAW                                                                                   
SUJET/ SUBJECT: LES MARIAGES HOMOSEXUELS / SAME-SEX MARRIAGES 
QUESTIONNAIRE PREPARED BY PROFESSOR MACARENA SÁEZ           
GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL REPORTERS 
I. Major Aims 
Although the title of the topic is Same-sex Marriage, a full understanding 
of what different countries are doing requires a more comprehensive work 
than analyzing the existence (and in most cases inexistence) of same-sex 
marriage.  For this reason, the major aims of this chapter and of the session 
at the conference are: 
 
1. To gather statistics about each countries’ regulations on same-sex 
marriage. 
2. To analyze if there is a common pattern on the regulation of same-sex 
partners in the world or by region. 
3. To analyze the different conceptualizations of same-sex partnerships 
around the world. 
4. To map the progression of the status of same-sex partnerships around 
the world taking into consideration property regulations, social 
benefits, family law regulations, and tax benefits, among others. 
 
II. Questions to be addressed by the national reporters 
In your report, please address each of the following questions, related to 
the above objectives: 
 
1. Legal framework: Please briefly explain the legal system used in your 
country. Include information about the type of Constitution (written; 
unwritten; modifiable by a Constitutional Tribunal, by Supreme Court 
decisions, by Congress only; etc.) Please do not use more than one 
page to provide your legal framework. 
2. Constitutional regulations applicable to same-sex partnerships.  Please 
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be specific about the constitutional guarantees in your country that 
conflict/support same-sex marriage and those that can conflict/support 
same-sex unions in a format different than marriage.  Explain each 
case. 
3. Legal statutes: Does your country have a specific law allowing same-
sex marriage?  If yes, please give exact information about such law, its 
place among the authoritative sources of law and relevant information 
about its history. 
4. If your country regulates same-sex marriage, is there any formal 
difference in the treatment between different sex and same-sex 
marriages?  In other words, does the law that regulates same-sex 
marriage provide grounds for any differential treatment? What are 
those formal differences? 
5. If your country does not have a same-sex marriage regulation.  Please 
specify if your country has some sort of civil union regulation.  If so, 
please specify the statute, its place among the authoritative sources of 
law, and the conditions for entering into a civil union. 
6. If your country has a civil union regulation, please specify if this is 
open to heterosexual couples or only to same-sex couples. 
7. If the civil union statute is open to heterosexual and same-sex couples, 
please specify if there is any formal differential treatment between both 
types of couples within such legal framework. 
8. If your country does not have a specific regulation on same-sex 
partnerships, please indicate if there are other legal statutes that 
specifically recognize same-sex partners for specific purposes, i.e.: 
domestic violence act, inheritance rights act, adoption laws, etc. 
9. Is your country discussing future regulation on same-sex marriage? If 
so, please explain the type of regulation being proposed, at what level 
(constitutional, legislative, administrative, etc.), in what stage the 
discussion is at present, what are the chances of being passed and 
when. 
10. Is your country discussing future regulation on same-sex unions in a 
format different than marriage?  If so, please explain the type of 
regulation being proposed, at what level (constitutional, legislative, 
administrative, etc.), in what stage the discussion is at, what are the 
chances of being passed, and when. 
11. Non legislative regulations: does your country provide specific 
benefits/rights to same-sex couples via administrative acts?  i.e.: death 
pension for the surviving partner; hospital visitations or the right to 
make decisions when one of the partners is incapacitated to make them. 
Please provide details. 
12. Judicial construction of the law: Are there any relevant decisions in 
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your country that had or may have future impact in the legal 
construction of same-sex marriage or in the legal recognition of same-
sex unions/partnerships?  Please provide the date and name of the case, 
and briefly explain the case and its relevancy for this topic. 
13. Additional comments: Please feel free to include additional comments 
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